

Burke, Margaret Sullivan

Story of Hercules

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# THE STORY OF HERCULES,

OR THE

## TRUTH ABOUT THE FINANCIAL LEGISLATION

OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

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BY MARGARET SULLIVAN BURKE.

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PRICE—Post paid: Single copy, 15c; two copies, 25c; ten copies, \$1.00; Special prices on larger quantities.

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## DEDICATION.

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It may be well to dedicate to the dead, a work which is as replete with dead issues and misstatements as one that has been published under the auspices of the Populist Party, that is doing no end of mischief by its misleading fabrications. But for me, proud in the consciousness that I am dealing with the living issues of the day, and that I have misrepresented nothing, and nothing extenuated, and that the Archives of my Country will prove it, I desire to dedicate this little work to the very living thing I know, the Republican Party.

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## PREFACE.

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I do not believe much in prefaces, because they are usually in the nature of an apology; and I have no excuse to offer for writing this little pamphlet.

I will only say, therefore, that to the very best of my ability I have built every statement therein upon the sure foundation of public records, which are free for all to examine. I have not taken one single fact from hearsay, but, with the Financial Laws before me, and the reports of their operation all these years to show the effect of their enforcement, at my side, I have seen for myself the truth, and I have given it without bias.

M. S. B'

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## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCING OUR MODERN HERCULES, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

Of all the heroes of ancient times, Hercules bears the palm as the working hero, and his twelve wonderful labors have been rehearsed in song and story till most of the world is familiar therewith.

The affairs of a great nation, when rightly conducted, are labors worthy, not only of a hero like Hercules, but of the whole Olympian fraternity of gods put together, and with all his strength and wisdom, the labors of the aforesaid heathen deity seem puny indeed when compared with the work of our modern Hercules, the Republican party.

But, alas! As it was a woman who attempted the destruction of this ancient hero, so, history repeating itself, a woman has been found, even in this more enlightened day, to send her serpents of sophistry and detraction to sting to death, if possible, the giant power that saved our country from the dangers of the past, and set it upon a sure foundation. But, thanks to the bright spirit of truth, he will still be able to crush them.

Dropping metaphor, I desire to call the attention of Republicans everywhere to the cunningly devised sophisms of a new party lately sprung up from nothing, like a mushroom in the night. They have issued numerous pamphlets, in which they blindly attack the grand work of the master minds of the time, simply because their own ignorance is so dense that they can not understand the same.

Their chief work on this subject being written by a woman deserves attention, because had a man been the author, one need not look far for the true inwardness of the whole matter, for, since the time when Adam tried to deceive his Maker, men will labor to prove that black is white when they have an end to serve, not in the least deterred either by the hopelessness of the task. But the fact that a woman is the author of the screed proves that some may honestly see with the obliquity of vision that would make black seem white from a negative stand-point, for women are honest if not always wise.

This party, which is made up, principally, of people all unlearned in matters of the kind, have presumed to criticise the great financial acts of our modern Hercules, the Republican Party, that saved our country from the Stymphalides—a monster of slavery, treason, rebellion, and war, feeding on human flesh—and placed it on the basis of solid growth and prosperity.

The very first statement in this book of their faith is so glaringly untrue that one can but wonder where this female Rip Van Winkle has been sleeping all this while, to know no better. It is the tale of a supposed “infamous plot” that resulted in our civil war, making the charge that there was nothing in the condition of the masses of our people that denoted prosperity, but rather a tendency to poverty and demoralization.

Remember this was written four or five years ago, at the time of our highest prosperity, when under the benign influence of a protective tariff party, new industries were springing up all over the land; and is especially adapted to the work of

roselyting ignorant voters, because it appeals to their sensibilities, rather than their sense.

Now turn the glass of time backward forty years and behold! How was it then with the middle classes? The children were taught "the three R's," it is true, and most of them learned to work; but where were the schools and colleges of to-day? Where the culture of the boys, and accomplishments of the girls? A lass who could drum on the piano then was thought a wonder, and to think of owning the instrument was the wildest extravagance; whole towns could only boast of one or two each. Calico was the regulation fabric for the girl's gown, and her beau matched it in jeans. The parlor—it was only "the front room" then—was carpeted with a wondrous construction of strips of rag and coarse wine, and the rest of the furnishing was made to correspond. The men labored, on an average, for half a dollar per day, and the women did their own work. Nobody starved, it is true, because everybody worked and did not care to keep up the styles, and in this respect the conditions have not permanently changed, although, the control of the government having since gone into the hands of those who are unfriendly to a protective tariff, many of those industries mentioned above have suspended because they could not go on manufacturing in the dark wares that might be subject to competition with the product of the under-paid labor of Europe, without cutting wages down to a figure that would afford no *American* household subsistence.

People who are willing to work in America seldom starve, and, on the other hand, almost invariably live well; and yet it is true that we find discontent and dissatisfaction on all sides, and the

very fullness of our prosperity is responsible for that, in a measure; for the more people have the more they want, and with natural indolence and the bad advice of communistic theorists, there are sure to be some always who will go to the wall, while their frugal, industrious, managing neighbors heap up the riches that they envy. This abundance is not denied to those who produce it, but to the tramps who idle on the highways, while those producers seek in vain for efficient laborers to help them.

Infinite variety is the bright background of humanity, and while the old world jogs along there will be a difference in men; some will make a good living while others would starve to death, without help; but how can the country that offers its opportunities freely to all be held responsible for that?

What is the reason that half the world is overworked, while the other half is idle? Let me tell you the secret; it is because everybody is after the efficient worker, and he therefore has more than he can do, while nobody wants the "botch," and he goes unemployed, and cries against the injustice of his thorough neighbor, who enjoys the fruits of intelligent labor. The unequal distribution of the products of labor is usually in exact ratio with the unequal exertions of the parties concerned, aided largely, of course, by the inequality of their intelligence.

If millionaires are not indigenous to American soil, as these people facetiously proclaim, neither are factories, railroads, nor any other of the myriad of business enterprises that have brought wealth to some; while the other some, who have not erected

he factories, railroads, etc., are not millionaires. "The laborer is worthy of his hire," and if a man earns money by his labor, or business enterprise, I do not see why he should not possess it.

And right here let me drive a peg upon which his third party may hang mistake number one. The civil war was the outcome of a disregard to this very principle by a portion of our country. The laborer in the "good old ante-bellum days" did not receive his hire, for the man who smoked his pipe in idleness on the broad southern veranda doled out to him a pittance only of it, his slice of bacon and bucket of meal each day, although the granaries he had filled were indeed bursting with the fruits of the poor slave's labor. That slave to-day is respectably clothed, and lives in a comfortable home, whenever he has the good sense to work half as hard for himself as he once was driven to do for his master; and all this he owes to the Republican party. Colored Democrats remember that.

With a country filled by such possibilities as ours, it would be strange, indeed, if there were no millionaires; and we will have idle vagabonds to create riots just as long as we have the Populist Party to reach anarchy on the floor of the Senate, as well as in campaign documents. But even if visionaries of that stamp could bring about this equitable (?) division of our moneys, how much would each person have, do you suppose? Well, I will tell you. The money in circulation at present, equally divided, would give each man, woman, and child \$24.19, and all the money in the Treasury added would only raise it to \$35.05. Not much of a fund upon which to go into business, is it? But even could we hit on some

plan by which we could establish a sort of rotation in office, loaning each man in turn, as capital to start in business all the funds of the country for a reasonable time, with the privilege of retaining all the profits, the conditions would be exactly the same as they are now inside of fifty years, and some men would not be able to pay back the loan; and this state of things will exist just as long as variety is the foundation of nature, and some men are intelligent, managing, and industrious, while others are ignorant, shiftless and lazy; and the great law of "the survival of the fittest" will so adjust the balance that the world will still maintain its equilibrium in spite of the cranks. And where is there another nation in which the chances are even as equally divided, with all our inequalities, as they are in our country after all?

The Republicans had come into power, an infant party, to find already laid upon their shoulders the burden of a large debt, the mongrel offspring of an illicit union of the Democratic party of America, and the English Cobden Club.

Polk had been victorious under a tariff banner, leading the people, who really desired protection, with the delusive cry of "Polk, Dallas and the Tariff of '42," but as soon as he was installed in office, with a Democratic Senate and House at his back, the tariff of '42 was repealed, the professed protection champion, George M. Dallas, furnishing the casting vote on the question of its engrossment, in the equally divided Senate; and this law was maintained until 1861.

Of course there soon was not enough revenue, for not only did foreign supplies come in without contributing anything to keep up the expenses of the

market where they sold their goods, but our own factories and workshops, that might have yielded both property and income tax, were closed down, and they had neither property nor income to tax; so Buchanan was obliged to ask a loan to pay the *current expenses* of his outgoing administration.

The Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb, in his report on the finances, dated December 22, 1859, had estimated that there would be a balance in the Treasury, June 30, 1861, of only \$3,530,196.61, which left no margin for additional appropriations. The public debt amounted to nearly \$60,000,000. The Secretary, in a spasm of patriotism, expressed himself to the effect that the idea of increasing the public debt to meet the ordinary expenses of the Government should not be entertained for a moment, and suggested the tariff as the way out of the difficulty. But Democracy was joined to its idols, and could not bow down to this new god, even under such desperate circumstances; and inasmuch as they had been steadily increasing that debt during the whole of the administration, till the sum total amounted to an increase of \$47,404,426.70, they could not be expected to be very squeamish—and this, too, in a time of peace under a tariff that actually discriminated against our own people, as under its workings we paid \$100,000,000 abroad for every \$15,000,000 of revenue collected at home.

No wonder, then, that the President failed to borrow, under the act approved June 22, 1860, as shown by the records of the Treasury, the very moderate sum of \$21,000,000 on the credit of the United States at an interest not to exceed six per cent., and only succeeded in raising the pitiful sum of \$7,022,000, at five per cent.

In desperation Secretary Cobb, in his report, Dec 4, 1860, cried aloud after this fashion: "The condition of the Treasury is such that no serious delay can be indulged." He thereupon recommended that authority be given for issuing Treasury notes to be negotiated at such rates as would command the confidence of the country, adding: "To create that confidence I recommend that *the public lands be unconditionally pledged for the ultimate redemption of all the Treasury notes which it may become necessary to issue.*" A mortgage on the country, you understand; although this did not actually occur; notwithstanding that, on this recommendation of the Secretary of the Treasury it was attempted in the House, and only prevented because it would have interfered with the homestead bill then under discussion. And like Banquo's ghost we have this very same old idea now haunting the members of the Populist Party. They would issue unlimited greenbacks, but they would peril the American homestead thereby.

The loan was finally negotiated without this new departure, but only by paying the biggest interest rate ever allowed before or since. Under the act of December 17, 1860, \$10,010,900 was issued at interest ranging from 6 to 12 per cent. It was under this act that 15 to 36 per cent was asked, and no wonder, when such a state of affairs existed.

But the credit of the Government was so low at this time that the secretary, then John A. Dix, suggested in a letter to the Ways and Means Committee, dated Jan. 18, 1861, that the several States be asked to pledge the deposits received by them from the Government under the act for the distribution of the surplus revenues in 1836; for there was an actual



deficit in the revenues of \$21,677,524, with a deficiency, also, of \$24 000,000 asked for, and these were sold at a discount of nearly 11 per cent., in a time of peace, too, to get cash to pay the debts of the outgoing administration, for which a free trade policy provided insufficient revenue, instead of the premium our bonds command now, and have commanded ever since the Republican Party came into power; for at the extra session of Congress called July 4, 1861, only six months after, with eleven States in rebellion, the Republican Administration found it easy to obtain almost \$400,000,000, because the monied people of the North saw the necessity of contributing their means to save the Nation; no particular patriotism in that, for self-preservation is the first law of nature.

Of this sum \$189,321,350, at six per cent., sold at par; \$60,030,000 old demand notes, with no interest, at par also, and \$139,999,950, at 7 3-10 per cent. interest—the highest ever paid by a Republican Administration—actually sold at a premium of 465 one-thousandths of one per cent., with war really begun.

What an awful "Shylock" was that, for this is the way the American banker "took advantage," with the war threatening to wipe the whole of it away; and the above is the pretty name these vili-ers give to the people who loaned money to the Government to help in this emergency. But history will vindicate the character of the men who risked their means on the chances of war, and thus helped to save the country. They turned a river of gold into the Augean stable where wrong doing and false principles had herded, and swept away all its foul pollutions.

It is not usury, but business all the world over to receive for one's loans a rate of interest commensurate with a risk of losing the whole. And what security had our Government to offer in those days, with 10,244,114 of her people in open rebellion and 2,145,348 of the money producers, among the loyal ones, taken from their shops, offices, factories, and other wealth-producing occupations to defend her against these fratricidal children, but a possibly bankrupt future?

I am making no defence of Wall Street, for may be that somewhere in the pages of history there is recorded a case of such sublime patriotism as a man, or a set of them, who deliberately impoverished themselves for the sake of their country but I confess that I have not been able to find it and I am inclined to think it nothing but human after all, to follow that first law of nature. I do not know exactly how large the beam in my own eye would have been under those circumstances and so I will just let my brother's little moil alone.

While Republicans managed our finances there was never a dollar sold at a discount, either in time of peace or war, a pretty good indication of the confidence in their integrity accorded, not only by our own people, but by the world at large; an integrity that would not stoop to rob those who trusted it; and yet they came into power on the eve of war, with a bankrupt treasury and a mortgaged country, the mongrel progeny of Democracy and Free-trade, before mentioned, that was left for the new party to dispose of, bind out, or send to the reform school; a result brought about by an old experienced party, and left on the eve of war

enumber this new and untried power. But they met every obligation like men, and with the former four years of the Cleveland Administration—that at least did them no good—counted out, they brought us up to March 4, 1893, when, with an aggregate of \$764,322,266.78 cash in the Treasury, of which \$217,672,947.91 was gold coin and bullion, they had our debt so arranged, with a minimum interest, too, that it could be easily paid by the foreign revenues of the country as it fell due; and without repudiating the claims of our own people for pensions, improvements, etc., if the marplots would have let our revenues alone. This was, however, almost too much to expect, with the Government turned over “soul, body, and breeches,” by the foolishness of the people, to its enemies; and where the bullet failed to ruin the country, the ballot *may* be more effectual. They wanted a “change,” and it begins to look like they had gotten it with a vengeance. But I want to enter my protest here, and now, (July 28, 1894), against the cowardly attempt that is being made to shift the blame from the shoulders to which it legitimately belongs, to those whose wise legislation in the past has lifted them above such a charge.

Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated March 4, 1861. Both Houses were Republican. This was, however, not such a rose-colored state of affairs for that party, as it would be under ordinary circumstances, for their almost two-thirds majority in Senate and House was largely brought about by the secession of the eleven Southern States, before referred to, which of course cut the Democratic representation down, for although all Democrats were not rebels, all rebels were Democrats during the Civil War.

With their ranks thus depleted and the war upon them, they actually held their first session in a military camp, when an extra session was called July 4—Independence Day, take notice—1861.

The day before that session adjourned Abraham Lincoln wrote that now illustrious name at the bottom of a new protective tariff measure, one of the first great acts of an administration full of eventful situations.

## CHAPTER II.

### HIS FIRST WORK—THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE.

When Congress convened in regular session, Dec. 9, 1861, it was found how far short even the wildest estimate had been of the necessities of war, and it was then that the legal-tender greenback was introduced. It was absolutely necessary to have money that would be good for all debts, public and private, but it was a dangerous proceeding to make this paper, with no intrinsic value of its own, good for debts that might come due after the money had become valueless. The Continental Currency, for instance, had been a partial legal tender by enactment of all the States except Rhode Island; and George Washington was obliged to receive it at par in payment of debts, when its value had depreciated to next to nothing.

Our legislators took the risk, however, and issued \$450,000,000 of them, fifty millions to be in lieu of the old demand notes, so called because they were payable on demand (payable in coin by the way), which have been paraded so by our Populist friends, because, as they say, they were on a level with gold, and "the millionaire took his hat off to them, while the banker made obeisance." The millionaire of our own land may have had a great deal of respect for them, it is true, but the millionaires of Europe were not built on that plan. They had seen too many governments rise and fall to have an overwhelming amount of faith in a new country like ours, thus divided against

itself, "promising to pay" with nothing behind the promise but a country at war among themselves. How could they know what the result of that war would be? They inclined to believe that the Government would be overthrown, in fact, and how much would this paper money be worth then, that was made legal tender for all debts public and private? So Europe looked askance at our greenbacks. They did not want to accept money on such uncertainties. Gold alone would bolster our credit there. It is true these notes paid the soldier, furnished his equipments, and gave a new impetus to commerce also, and to people of shallow understanding it would seem that the government might have gone on issuing them ad libitum, but—and there always is a "but" to folly—our importations had to be paid in coin values, and unless the duties on the same were demanded in coin, also our greenbacks would soon have been at the disadvantage of an unjust discrimination which would have lessened their purchasing power constantly, and thus diminished the duties also; and with every issue of these notes they would have decreased in value, and the rate of interest would have increased, till our paper would have been about as valuable as the old Continental Currency, or the Confederate shinplaster, viz: two cents per pound as paper rags. And as our Government had always made it the custom to pay the interest on our bonds in coin, because never before, in the history of the country, had anything else been legal tender, they had never thought of any other medium; and during the time that this was the case, the government had shouldered certain obligations, which the party of the other part entered into, with the understanding

that, of course, they would be paid in coin, because there was no other legal tender. Congress had no right, therefore, to pass a bill making paper legal tender *without* this very exception clause; but to make it understood that this custom would be continued, notwithstanding the war, it was thought best to put a clause in the act of Feb. 25, 1862, making that declaration, and, at the same time, an exception was made of import duties also. This terrible Exception Clause—Populist Conspiracy number one—the great mountain made out of a mole-hill because those learned in money matters were consulted,—saved our public credit, by making our bonds marketable abroad, and compelling the foreigner to pay the fiddler too, by requiring him to pay duty on his imports in coin, which thus provided the means of paying the interest of our bonds in coin, thus satisfying his demands out of his own pocket, giving Diomedes over to his own fire-breathing mares, to which he had erstwhile fed the flesh of his guests.

In this case honesty was not only the best policy, but it was the only policy; for, if the interest had not been paid in coin, we could have borrowed no money; and if the duties had not been paid in coin, we would have had no coin to pay the interest with.

Was it a crime that our native creditors were put on a level with the foreigner? Would they have us supply a different kind of sauce each, for goose and gander? If there was any advantage gained by the Wall street broker, *et al.*, there certainly was no way to prevent it. The country was in vital need of money, and, therefore, at the mercy of those who had money to lend; but it is no use for those who are vociferating against the government to in-

flate the facts. The almost fabulous price of gold on the morning of July 1, 1864, is attributed by them entirely to the fact that gold was thus made the medium for the payment of duties and interest on our bonds.

For *one single day* only, gold was at a premium of \$1.85 per cent., and yet these buzzards are constantly representing that sum as quite the general thing. They do not take the pains to tell you that the premium on gold dropped 35 cents on that very day, which was brought about by an act passed by those "dreadful men who were conniving at robbery," passed by an overwhelming majority, too.

If it was true that the Exception Clause was responsible for this sudden rise in gold, how are we to account for the fact that it was higher for two months before that act was passed than it was for two months after? This is true, however, as shown by the records of the Treasury. And these records, taken in conjunction with the history of the war at that period, show more; they show that all the time gold fluctuated, now high, and then low, with the tide of every battle. With every defeat of the Union army gold went up, with every success it went down; and this was too often repeated, altogether, to be a mere coincidence.

For instance, the victory of Grant at Fort Donelson occurred the very month in which the greenback act was passed, and gold went down to 101.5, instead of up, as these populists claim. But in the month of July following, McClellan was defeated after seven days' battle before Richmond, and gold sprang up to 115.5. In December General Burnside was defeated at Fredericksburg, and gold rose to 132.3. But in July of '63 came Meade's victory at



Gettysburg, and Grant's capture of Vicksburg, and down went gold to 125.8. Then came "Old Rosey's" defeat at Chickamauga, and the siege of his army at Chattanooga, and gold went up with a bound, till it sold in the following month at 147.7. In May of 1864, Grant in Virginia, and Sherman in Georgia, were fighting desperately, but making slow progress, and gold still went up. Grant, after a series of dreadful battles, in which he suffered terrible losses, had been brought up with a round turn before Petersburg: and there, owing to the daily withdrawal of regiments, which had served their three years, he seemed likely to be kept for an indefinite period. Sherman was making slow progress toward Atlanta, and Early had commenced the movement which brought him within four miles of the capital; foreign intervention seemed more imminent than ever before, and the outlook was dark indeed, in the month of July, 1864, and gold floated on the billows of our disaster up to an average of 258.1. But in September, Sheridan's great victory came to revive our hopes, and gold fell 32 cents from the month previous; and after the closing scenes of the rebellion at Appomattox in March and April, gold took a series of plunges downward and though it still fluctuated, as public confidence was great or little in the Congressional battles to which our interests had been transferred, it never rose so high again.

The unsophisticated reader is left in the dark also about another experiment of our legislators, who were trying every means, in their efforts to do all they could to better our condition, an experiment that lasted fifteen days, and therefore not long enough for all the people to starve to death.

In the beginning of 1864 the war had come to a crisis where the result was so doubtful that nothing else was certain either. Specie payments had been suspended since 1861, and the credit of the Government, represented by the premium on gold when purchased for legal tenders, fluctuated, as I have shown at the result of every battle or even skirmish of the two armies. The average price of gold dollar in greenbacks in January was \$1.50, which advanced in April to \$1.72. Secretary Chase believed this to be caused by a conspiracy to depress our credit, and brought the matter before the Finance Committee in a letter asking the enactment of a law prohibiting speculation in gold, or in other words, the sale of gold by parties who had none to sell. He admitted that there was a doubt whether the bill would accomplish the desired relief. The bill passed on the 17th of June, but the price of gold went up steadily, and the excitement became so great that all business operations were thrown into confusion. The result of the war hung trembling in the balance, and it took very little to turn the scale. Congress was snowed under by petitions for the repeal of the law, and Congress was not slow to obey. July 1, gold opened at \$2.85, but that day was the last. The repealing act was passed by the Senate almost unanimously, and an hour later had been rushed through the House and signed by the President. That day gold dropped 35 cents and continued downward.

The men of Wall street, in common with others who had gold to sell on that day, doubtless received the market price for it; and if this constitutes a Shylock, I will myself be compelled to cry *peccavi!* for on the very day that gold reached its

maximum, I remember that my girlish hoard of four shining dollars brought me just \$11.40 in purchasing shoes, gown and back-comb, those things so dear to the feminine heart. I wonder if any saintly female Populist would have given the whole for a four dollar pair of shoes and gone without the new gown and back-comb, because the soldier, who had nothing but greenbacks, could get but one hundred cents for his dollar? And how much did it help him, do you suppose, that an old lady of my acquaintance, who had a big bag of gold at the same time, refused to do as I did, and held on to it till, like fairy gold, it had almost two-thirds of it melted away?

In an appendix to the book referred to before, which is written by one of the author's "indomitable colleagues"—they are all indomitable in that book, by the way—which appendix, by a sort of mutual admiration arrangement, is printed in the twelfth edition thereof, the statement is made that with \$50,000 in gold a banker could buy a \$100,000 bond, which is a transaction on exactly the same principle; because at that time the stress of circumstances had made the basis of our values unnatural. The farmer received \$2.50 per bushel for his wheat also; but when the time came for the bond to be redeemed his \$50,000 in gold would only have bought a \$50,000 bond, for the war was over, and resumption had squared the values.

I knew a woman, a poor lodging-house keeper in this city a few years ago, who saved a little money. She heard that a valuable piece of real estate was about to be sold at auction. She attended the sale; the money market was close, the weather bad that day, and so there were not many bidders. She was

lucky enough to bid it in at a low price, the first payment just her "pile," and before the next payment was due she sold the property at four times what she paid for it, paid the balance due, and pocketed a small fortune as her profits. It was stress of circumstances that worked in her favor and not any sudden change in the real value of the property that gave her this advantage.

From the Wall street banker to the huckster in our market places, from whom the Populist purchases his vegetables at the very lowest possible price for which he can get them, every one of them gets the highest market price for his wares, when he can. That is nothing but trade, and where does Shylock come in?

## CHAPTER III.

### LABOR SECOND—THE NATIONAL BANKING ACT.

The national banking act is what they call "conspiracy number two," and like all the rest of the signs and wonders of the Populist Party, it is easily disposed of.

Years ago, when "Shylock" was a very humble individual, upon whose gabardine this third party could expectorate to its heart's content, the American people looked to the State bank for their convenience in the shape of paper money. These State banks were founded according to the varied ideas of the individuals concerned, issuing their "promises to pay" with only one-third of their circulation secured by funds, lands, mortgages, or property of any kind. This was the Hydra, with more than a hundred heads, that Hercules slew.

A man could start a bank on the buying value of land, that had depreciated on his hands till he could not sell it for twenty per cent. of what he paid for it. Their notes were payable in current funds, and often limited in time, two very cunning traps for the unwary. The current funds were mostly old and mutilated bills, fractional currency, and the like, with now and then a respectable note. These were paid out after the manner of the world at large—where the "kicker" generally gets it—the old worn out notes to the poor man, who was glad to get anything for his hard day's work, and the new, crisp notes to the "kicker" aforesaid, who was generally a rich business man; or were

personally appropriated as long as possible. When the limit of time ran out, woe unto him in whose pockets these notes were found ; and it was not in the rich man's pockets usually, for it is only the poor who make a bank of their pocket-books, and the rich man, who can aggregate his money, looks too closely after it to let it die on his hands. A man dare not sleep over night with any considerable number of these notes in his pockets, not because he feared thieves, but because he might find them so depreciated by next morning that much of their value would have stolen away.

Then, too, this money was very little of it at par, and the discount varied, not only in the different States, but the same money was more or less valuable, according to the distance it traveled from home. For instance, Indiana notes, that were tolerably good at home, were so clipped by the time they reached New York that even the banker himself, if he were a merchant also, as was often the case, would never think of taking his own notes East when he went to buy goods. All this made the banker's work no sinecure, and he, like everybody else in this selfish world, must be paid for his labor, besides it took money to transport these notes from one point to another when they had traveled so far away from home as to be next to worthless : and the money, to do all this, was secured in the shape of farther discount, which came out of the poor man's pocket every time—the man who spent the money for bread.

Something must be done ; and Congress set out to do it. They did not go to work and issue unlimited fiat-money, according to the wild theories of visionaries, but they determined to devise a

plan that would forever put an end to the wild-cat banking, that had previously been stimulated by such unsecured circulation. Men actually issued their private "promises to pay" on their farm stock, and the cow, horse, or hog, whichever it happened to be, was set forth by a description giving all its best points, and carefully abstaining from mentioning defects. This plan, by the way, is of the same kind that is now part of the Populist idea, I believe.

On February 25, 1863, the Government established by Act of Congress a uniform National bank system, the very best in all the world, amended by an Act of June 3, 1864, by which in all these years, no note holder has lost a dollar, because every cent in circulation, and 11 1-9 per cent. over, is secured by actual deposit of bonds so that it not only has the good faith of our Government behind it, but is secured by at least forty per cent. more than its actual *bona fide* circulation, because its notes are never all out at once. No robbery in that.

Now as to certain wild statements about the bond-holding banker's double interest, let us see. It is true that he receives interest on his bond, and that he gets interest from those who borrow the bank-notes that represent nine-tenths of that bond. This looks very much like being paid twice, if you look the way the Greenbacker points. But I warn you that you will acquire obliquity of vision if you take such a one-sided view of things, and I propose to show you the other side.

A man always has a right to his own, and the man who buys bonds with his money, instead of lending it in some other way, may "pay his money and take his choice." In either case the increase

is his earnings. If he wishes to go into banking, he must associate with himself at least four others, and the five must act as directors. They must have a capital of at least \$100,000, though they may bank on half that sum in towns not exceeding six thousand inhabitants, by the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. They draw this sum from former investments, thus foregoing the legal interest they had been receiving for it, which in many of the States is drawing ten per cent., and is in only one State less than six. With this sum they buy their bonds—we will take the highest in existence under Republican rule, drawing four per cent.—receiving upon it \$4,000 interest, which can be paid in advance, of not more than one year, at the discretion of the Secretary, but seldom is so paid. (The authority for this will be found in section 3699 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and was meant, as every one knows, for the convenience of the people during the movement of the crops, etc. The Secretary could demand a rebate in return for this accommodation, too, if he chose.) They receive, also, bank notes to use in circulation for nine-tenths of the value of their bond. This gives them four per cent. interest annually, for the whole sum of \$100,000, and the opportunity to earn additional interest on \$90,000. So far, so good; it is all plain sailing with the gentlemen bankers. But—they must pay on the spot a premium of at least \$16,000; I believe it is higher now; and four per cent. for printing their bank note paper, \$3,600 more; they must deposit \$4,050,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., as a redemption fund to be employed in restoring the notes mutilated by use, thus to secure the user from loss. These sums take up at



once the \$4,000 interest and \$19,650 besides, that must all be withdrawn from their former operations. Then they have annual expenses to pay. First the yearly examination into the condition of their bank, made by the Government, costs them \$100, and publishing their quarterly statements of said condition about as much more ; and added to all this they must pay an annual tax of one per cent. on their circulation, deposits, etc.

Thus they must pay down at least \$123,650 in order to get their \$90,000 in bank notes, and after that their one per cent. interest, and the other expenses, which are about a quarter of a cent per cent. more, making an annual outlay of \$1,125 to say nothing of rent, heat, clerk hire, mail service, monthly statement printed in the newspapers, etc., which will consume each year the interest as fast as it comes due. And after all, the Government does not give them the bank notes, for even after they have paid for printing them, out of their own pockets, they are nothing but blanks, worth no more than ordinary blank bank checks, till is added the signature of president and cashier, which gives them their only value, which is much or little as they—"the bloated bondholders"—are worth much or little. The Government gives no value whatever to these notes ; it merely secures the creditor of the bank against loss by holding the bankers' bond to be used in making good every note issued against it.

I knew a case where a wealthy man wrote his autograph in a woman's album in the shape of a bank check. The woman's son collected the sum mentioned in the improvised check, and the courts on a trial decided in favor of the young man. It

was the money represented by the signature, not the paper torn from the album, that made it current at the bank.

So you see our bankers have at once swallowed up their whole interest and \$16,500 more, beside leaving one-tenth of their money in limbo, drawing but 4 per cent. interest. Now if they should lend all the balance at the rate which is fixed by law to correspond with the legal interest of the State where the bank is situated, they would be getting no more than their former interest. But a banker never depletes his bank by lending out all his notes at once, so some must always be idle.

Thus you see this "villainous robber" has gained nothing after all; in fact has lost by his change of base from a simple business man to a "bloated bond-holder," only that he has a wider field in which to operate, and that was what he was after in the first place, for money, dependent on outside investment, is often unemployed. The law fixes the amount, too. The act of June 3, 1864, reads:

Every association hereinafter named shall, at all times, have on hand, in lawful money of the United States, an amount equal to at least 25 per centum of the aggregate amount of its notes in circulation, and of its deposits; and every other association shall at all times have on hand, in lawful money of the United States, an amount equal to at least 15 per centum of the aggregate amount of its notes in circulation, and of its deposits.

This was changed in the act of June 20, 1874, by the repeal of that part which applies to the circulation, but left a reserve on the deposits still.

He has no monopoly in this either, for anybody can buy a bond on precisely the same terms, and any set of people can join their bonds together and start a bank, too, even the servant girls in your

kitchen. Oh! ye reformers of our money service, unless you pay them fiat money for their wages, in which case they would soon have to interview the paper-rag man.

That men take advantage of our banking laws to rob the poor, as these so-called sympathizers claim, I positively deny, because I do not see how they can. The banker is not allowed to loan money on mortgages or accept security on real estate, save to secure a debt previously contracted that can not otherwise be liquidated, and then, as is the custom the world over, the man's property becomes responsible for his indebtedness. The law fixes the rate of interest at the lawful rate of the State or Territory where the bank is located; and when no interest is fixed by the laws of the State, they can charge but seven per cent., the penalty for disobeying this is to lose all of the interest, except in cases that are specified.

It is true, however, that human wisdom has not yet found a way to prevent the wicked from turning good into evil, because there has been discovered no law that will be accommodating enough to work both ways at once. But even divine law has the same result, and the sun still shines, after all these centuries, on the unjust along with the just.

And with all their faults we would hardly be bettered by the change to Government banking that has been discussed and proven inadequate, periodically, ever since the first National bank was started, and as the mare's nest hunters are again agitating the subject, it would, perhaps, be as well to quote Secretary McCulloch's disposition of the subject. In his report on the state of the finances,

dated November 30, 1867, the currency question is settled as follows:

This subject is before the public upon two propositions: 1. To deprive the National banks of the right to issue notes for circulation, in order that the Government may issue its own notes in their place. 2. To issue United States notes, in payment of compound interest notes, seven-thirty notes, and five twenty bonds, as they mature and become payable. To state the first proposition fairly, it proposes to withdraw the circulation of National banks in order that the Government may occupy the whole field. The \$300,000,000 of bank notes to be replaced by \$300,000,000 of United States notes.

The \$300,000,000 of United States notes are to be used for the purchase of United States bonds, which are to be canceled; and thus non-interest bearing notes are to be substituted for interest bearing bonds, whereby a saving is to be effected of the amount of interest that would otherwise be paid upon the bonds so canceled.

It is claimed that by payment of interest on the bonds deposited by the National banks with the Treasurer of the United States as security for their circulating notes, the Government pays to the banks a *bonus* for issuing \$300,000,000 of currency which it might have without the *bonus* by issuing its own notes.

This is a plausible proposition. Many of its advocates are honest in the belief that by acting upon this theory the Government would actually save \$18,000,000 per annum, and they are entitled to a fair hearing.

The National banks are authorized to issue \$300,000,000 of currency. The same amount of legal tenders substituted for this currency, would purchase \$277,800,000 United States bonds at 108, which is less than the present market price. The interest on these bonds at six per cent, would be \$16,668,000.

If the bonds could be purchased at 105, the legal tenders would buy \$285,700,000, the interest upon which would be \$17,142,000.

If the bonds could be bought at par, there would be \$300,000,000, upon which the interest would be \$18,000,000.

The National banks, however, for the year 1866, actually paid over \$16,000,000 in taxes, as follows:

To the Federal Government, . . . . .	\$8,069,938
To the States, . . . . .	7,949,451
Total, . . . . .	<u>16,019,389</u>

(The above was based upon the reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the returns of the banks from each State.)

As the revenues of the general Government are derived from taxation, the return of any sum by the banks of the State government, in the way of taxes, is substantially a return to the people who pay federal taxes, and is properly credited to the banks in any statement of account between them and the Government.

If the bonds purchased by this new issue of legal tenders cost 108, the interest on such bonds would be \$16,668,000; direct taxes paid, \$16,019,389; amount saved, \$648,611. If the bonds cost 105 the amount saved would be \$1,122,611.

If the bonds could be bought at par the amount saved would be \$2,000,000.

This is the sum total to be saved under the aspect of the case most favorable to the advocates of the proposed change.

But this is not all. The National banks are compelled by law to hold constantly in reserve a certain percentage of their circulation and deposits in United States legal-tender notes. The amount thus held permanently in reserve is never less than \$150,000,000 (generally about \$180,000,000), and is a gratuitous loan to the Government. The banks get no interest on it. It is so much of their capital unproductive, invested in non-interest-bearing notes of the Government.

The case may now be stated thus. The banks have loaned to the Government as follows:

For bonds deposited to secure their circulation	
bearing six per cent. interest . . . . .	\$250,000,000
bearing five per cent. . . . .	90,000,000
Permanent reserve of legal tenders . . . . .	<u>150,000,000</u>
Total loan to the United States . . . . .	\$490,000,000
For which they receive six per cent. interest on	
\$250,000,000 . . . . .	\$15,000,000
five per cent. on \$90,000,000 . . . . .	<u>4,500,000</u>
Total . . . . .	\$19,500,000
but they refund in taxes . . . . .	16,000,000
leaving . . . . .	<u>3,500,000</u>

Which the Government pays the banks for a loan of \$190,000,000, a little less than three-fourths of one per cent.

But there is still another aspect of the case :

The banks are held rigidly accountable for the interest they receive on money honestly loaned to the Government when it needed money, and they claim credit for the money loaned to the Government without interest. They hold these \$150,000,000 in obedience to the mandates of the law while money worth to them six per cent. They, therefore, give the Government the use of the money—that is to say, six per cent. on \$150,000,000 non-interest bearing notes, held permanently in reserve, \$9,000,000 ; they repay in shape of taxes, \$16,000,000 total, \$25,000,000 ; they receive from the Government, \$19,500,000, leaving \$5,500,000 which the bank actually pays to the Government as a bonus for the privilege of circulating their own notes.

The fact should not be overlooked in this connection that the banks have deposited \$240,000,000 with the Treasurer as security for their issues. Now the United States could not possibly buy over \$200,000,000 of these bonds without actual addition of \$30,000,000 or \$40,000,000 of greenbacks to the amount it is proposed to issue in lieu of \$300,000,000 of National bank notes. The result would be either that the Government would fail to save \$2,400,000 interest on \$4,000,000 of its bonds, which it could not purchase, or it would have to try the dangerous and unnecessary experiment of again inflating the currency.

The \$90,000,000 of 5 per cent. bonds might be bought at par	\$90,000,000
Suppose the 6 per cent. bonds could be bought at 106 (though they are now selling much bigger)—	
\$250,000,000 at 106	265,000,000

It would take	\$355,000,000
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to buy the bonds now held by the banks. Here is a direct inflation of \$55,000,000, which is the excess over the interest received by the banks, paid as a bonus for their circulation.

In fact the circulating feature of the National banks is a source of expense instead of an income for which reason no National banks have for years taken out over the minimum amount of circulation and they would abolish the circulating feature of

the law entirely if they could, because it is an expensive luxury.

On this subject Comptroller Lacey said in his report for 1890, after calling attention to the fact that the issuing of circulating notes by National Banking Associations was unprofitable, and in a majority of cases a positive loss, resulting from the high rate of premium established in the market upon the bonds of the United States available for the purpose of securing note issues:

In the opinion of the Comptroller the law governing National banks should be amended so as to produce the following modifications:

1. The minimum deposit of bonds to secure circulation should be fixed at ten per cent. of the capital stock in respect to all associations having a capital of \$300,000 or less, and for all banks having a greater capital, a minimum deposit of \$30,000 in bonds should be required.

2. Circulation should be issued to the par value of the bonds deposited.

3. The semi-annual duty on circulation should be so reduced as to equal one-fourth of one per cent. per annum.

These recommendations are renewed at the present time, without modification, except as to the first proposition, which might be so changed as to fix the minimum of bond deposit at the nominal sum of \$1,000 for each association without reference to the amount of capital stock paid in.

On the 15th of July, second year, the Hon. John Sherman, recognizing the same trouble, introduced a bill to meet the exigency, referring to which Comptroller Lacey says:

It will be observed that the bill provides:

1. That no association shall be required to maintain a bond deposit of more than \$1,000 to secure circulation.

2. That every association may issue circulation equal to the par value of its bonds so deposited.

3. That the monthly withdrawal of bonds under the act shall not exceed \$2,000,000 in the aggregate.

Under all the circumstances the Comptroller has no hesitation in earnestly recommending the passage of this bill.

It is a well-known fact that the circulation of the national banks is in process of retirement. During the five years ended October 31, 1890, the aggregate of their circulation based upon deposit of United States bonds has been reduced from \$276,304,189 to \$124,958,736, showing a net decrease during the five years of \$151,345,453. The net average decrease each of the past five years is \$30,269,090.

This is more significant when we take into account the fact that during this period there has been an average yearly increase of 168 in the number of National banks and an increase of \$39 in the aggregate.

It is evident, therefore, that causes are in operation which, unless removed, will in the near future reduce the circulation of National banks to the minimum requirement of the law.

"But," says the objector, "banks are not obliged to take out any circulation, and if it is a luxury, why take out even the minimum amount?"

It is true that the law governing the establishment of a National bank does not compel the taking out of any circulation, and there are many banks that do not take it out. For instance, there are five National banks in New York City, viz.: Chemical National, Mechanics National, Merchant National, National City Bank, National Park Bank, with a combined capital of \$7,300,000, that has not taken out a dollar of circulation, although entitled at that time to over \$5,000,000. And in Chicago the First National, the Merchants' National, and the Prairie State National are in the same category—they have no circulation. But, while not compelled to take out circulation, they are compelled to buy bonds and deposit with the Treasurer as a basis for a circulation, whether they want it or not, and also to deposit an amount equal to 5 per cent. of their bonds as a "redemption fund" to redeem a circulation which in the cases referred to they have not taken out.



After going to the expense of buying bonds at a premium of twenty per cent. and depositing five per cent. of their value with the Treasury for "redemption fund" it depends entirely upon the value of money in that particular locality whether a bank will care to go ahead and pay one per cent. tax and a dozen other expenses and take over ninety per cent. of the par value in circulation. Where money is worth ten and twelve per cent., as in the Western States, it will pay to do so, but where money is cheap it does not pay, even after they have the bonds deposited and have incurred the greatest expense—the premium on same. This is exactly why the banks quoted above have no circulation.

And Mr. Laeey says farther, in explaining a table in his report:

The foregoing table is perpetuated to show by comparison the falling off in the amount of bonds deposited in excess of requirement, and it will be seen that the percentage of excess has fallen from 28 in 1882-3 to 18 in 1889-90.

Of the 201 banks organized during the past fiscal year 168 have a capital of \$50,000 each, amounting to \$8,400,000; 77 have a capital of over \$50,000 and not exceeding \$150,000, and 46 have an aggregate capital of \$20,250,000. The 46 largest banks deposited the exact amount of bonds required by law, and of the remaining 245 banks only 7 deposited bonds in excess of the requirement.

Notwithstanding the accession of new banks to the system, the consequent deposit of bonds and issue of notes the outstanding circulation steadily decreases from year to year.

Now let us see just what a dollar bill does cost the banker.

Counting 4 per cent bonds at \$1.20, the banker gets that "one-dollar bill" had to deposit with the government \$1.33 $\frac{1}{3}$ , which, counting money at 10 per cent for convenience, would figure about this way: \*

Interest on \$1.33 $\frac{1}{2}$ , at 10 per cent.....	
Tax on circulation .....	
Interest on the 5 per cent redemption fund deposited .....	
All other expenses .....	
Total cost of one dollar .....	

From which should be subtracted :

Interest on bond .....	
Interest on dollar loaned .....	

Leaving a net loss of nearly 1 cent on every dollar issued or \$900 per annum by a bank with \$900 circulation.

And yet these Nineteenth Century wise-acs tell us that the banker is making 700 per cent on his investment. And this is a fair specimen of "reform party" mathematics.

But if their literature is remarkable in no other particular, it is remarkable in the way in which they fling wild statements around, without taking aim at the truth. If their efforts happen to hit it, well and good; if not—well, the times to do will inspire confidence, and the people will think it a foul, not a bad aim. They said: "*We have seen* that the banking interest had at one time representatives in Congress." Now, if we have seen it, they did not show it, and I have been able to find out when that time was. In another place, they declare it was when the "currency strengthening act" was passed. It was there at the Forty-first Congress. Turning to the records we find that there were ten bankers in all hold seats in that Congress, two Senators and eight R

representatives. Of these, but one poor, lone, solitary miscreant" was appointed on either of the great financial committees where the act was formulated; Alexander G. Cattell, a Senator from New Jersey, who was a merchant and banker also, was on the Finance Committee. The other members of that committee were all lawyers, but one, who was educated a soldier. The personnel of the Ways and Means Committee was also with a leaning to the law, all belonging to that profession but three, two merchants and one editor.

If there were 189 bankers in that Congress the records do not show it, and unless this Populist medium had a seance with some spirit I do not see how they discovered the secret, and of one thing I am sure, the spirit was not "the spirit of the times." Another spirit.

In the present Congress there is only a poor little brood, not enough to do much harm, let us hope. But if there ever were, as they represent, so great a number of bankers, why then I should think that, since the people elect those who best represent their interests, there must have been some very rich communities somewhere taking an interest in politics at that time; and with all due respect to the third Congress, and the Father of Our Country, I claim that all classes have a right to be represented. If the people elected the devil in sufficient numbers, and he secured legislation to remove the tax from the sulphurous regions to which it belongs and places the burden on the Salvation Army, whose fault would it be? In that case I could cry, "So mote it be! E pluribus Unum! Did I pinch the eagle's tail feathers till he squealed Amen!"

## CHAPTER IV.

### EXPLOIT THIRD.—CONTRACTION THAT DID NOT CONTRACT.

The mistakes of this modern Moses, the Populist party, which thus constitutes itself a guide to lead out of the wilderness of their muddled lack of understanding these fiat children—for I think the Populist must have been created by some unusual error, and not by the regular course of nature—mistakes, alas! do not end here.

The second fallacy is what is called “contraction of the currency,” and they specify the act of Act 12, 1866, as the mode by which this enormity was committed. The third exploit of our hero, showing the eagle which devoured the liver of our people credit.

Turning to Webster I find the word “contraction” defined thus: “The act of contracting, drawing together or shrinking,” and I am honestly at a loss to know what has been shrunken.

Greenbackers say it was the currency of the country, and for once give facts, so called, in substantiation of their assertion, along with the usual hyperbolical illustration. They say that by the act it was provided that “a regular and systematic cremation of greenbacks” should take place. Now we have heard what the Greenbackers say, let us find what the law had to say:

To authorize the Secretary of the Treasury, at his discretion, to *receive* any treasury notes or other obligations issued under any act of Congress, *whether bearing interest or not* in exchange for any description of bonds authorized by the act to which this is an amendment.

There it is: plain enough it seems. Merely an act authorizing the fulfillment of the promises of the Government to redeem these Treasury notes on the demand of their holders. If they are worth so much more than the bonds offered in exchange, it is strange that they were yielded up for cremation.

The non-interest bearing greenback was not the only paper called in by this act, as it applied not only to them, but other obligations.

As to the greenbacks themselves, statistics show that the highest amount ever outstanding was in July of 1864 when there were, at one time \$447,300,-203, and yet according to the Populist arithmetic, it is stated that in the year 1869 alone \$500,000,000 were destroyed.

To begin with, this puts more than twice the sum into the possession of the country in 1869, than seems to materialize on the Treasury reports. According to those there were in circulation at that date State bank notes, fractional currency, United States notes, National Bank notes, and specie in circulation on the Pacific coast, all included, \$673,-48,244; in the Treasury there were of the four kinds of circulating paper money mentioned above, \$80,839,010. This added together—which I take it would represent about all the circulating money in the United States, unless there was some invisible—would be a total of \$754,378,254; a long distance between that and almost two billions credited to us by these veracious reformers.

Next, it is stated that enormous sums were destroyed each year from 1866 to 1877, aggregating—without counting the first year, for which they do not condescend to furnish us the figures—the grand total of \$1,433,255,463; just \$681,877,207 more money than the circulating money in existence. Mind you

they expressly state that this money was taken from circulation, and attribute all the troubles incident to our business transactions at that time, to that fact, declaring that the decrease of money lowered the price of other property, doubled the debts of the poor man, and also the Government debt. A soul-harrowing picture, but it is only a picture, and not taken from life either. Now for the truth.

Reading from the law again: "But nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize any increase of the public debt," with the further provision: "That of United States notes not more than \$10,000,000 may be returned and canceled within six months from the passage of this act, and thereafter not more than \$4,000,000 in any one month." Now, using a little arithmetic, one sees at glance that \$48,000,000 was the utmost that could be retired in a whole year, and the first half year only \$10,000,000, and had the utmost been done that could be done under the law, the reduction would only have reached, in the time specified, a total of \$42,000,000. But, on the 4th of February, 1868, just one year, nine months and twenty-three days after the act, part of which is quoted above, an act was passed which reads as follows:

That from and after the passage of this act the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to make any reduction of the currency by retiring or canceling United States notes shall be and is hereby suspended, but nothing herein contained shall prevent the cancellation and destruction of mutilated United States notes, *and the replacing of the same with notes of the same character and amount.*

Had the utmost the law allowed of this "direct destruction" been accomplished, there would have been less than \$64,000,000 retired; but the outside limit was far from being attained, for but \$41,000,

000 had been retired and canceled when the suspending act was passed, leaving still outstanding \$356,000,000 of them, and at the same time additional National bank-notes were issued to the amount of \$135,342,048, with further annual issues, keeping pace with reductions elsewhere. The fractional currency was increased also, in that year, by an additional issue of \$2,065,048, this increasing also year by year.

Thus, in the years between the years 1866 and 1876, at which time subsidiary silver came into existence and the State bank-notes had at last all been replaced by better money, our circulating medium was increasing with almost steady uniformity from \$675,488,244 in 1866 to \$727,609,388 in 1876. This, too, through all the business trouble of which these people complain, and the panic of 1873. And yet in the face of this increase, *as shown by the records*, they declare that a scarcity of money was the cause of it all and ruined the value of other property.

We sold \$95,500,000 worth of bonds for gold, also, which was covered into the Treasury, thus securing the value of money in circulation and preventing loss to the people.

Besides all this, a greenback was not as good as gold in those days. *It is now*, because our wise Republican government made it so by the very acts that the Greenback Party is now decriing. In 1866 a gold dollar was worth just forty-one cents more than a greenback dollar; in 1867 it decreased three cents, but jumped back to 40 cents in 1868. From that time there was a steady but gradual decline till the resumption act made all money—like all men in this country—equal and at par all over the world.

Of the bonds issued at that time there were \$840,000,000 six per cents issued in exchange for seven-thirty notes; and nearly \$160,000,000 more for the compound interest notes, and other obligations maturing. Counting these, the figures displayed in the records will approximate to those of my distinguished though mistaken countrymen; and as other bonds, bearing a smaller interest, were issued in place of them, for nine-tenths of which bank notes were circulated, thus retiring these mature interest-bearing notes *as they came due*, without disturbing the circulation, I do not see how they can make a case; especially as these interest-bearing securities formed no part of the permanent circulation.

The one and two-year notes of 1863 and the compound interest notes were never in circulation more than a few months, just after they were issued for they were soon absorbed as investment securities, thus withdrawing them from circulation. The seven-thirty notes were not used as money nor paid out as such by the Treasury, but were only negotiated as a loan and issued by the Government to investors in exchange for legal-tender notes, being sold at par and accrued interest like any other loan. A soldier was paid now and then with one or more of them, less than \$10,000,000 in all, because he wanted to keep them for the interest. These were, therefore, never circulated.

Another reason why these notes could not have circulated as money among the poor—who were so greatly distressed on account of their withdrawal according to the Greenbacker—was their size. None of them were of a less denomination than \$50, of which there were \$44,509,900; of \$100 there were



\$137,634,600, and the remaining \$647,840,000 were in denominations of \$500, \$1,000, and \$5,000. To a poor man one of the smallest of these bonds would have represented his savings, to be hoarded away.

And yet another reason that no one, either poor or rich, would have tried to use these notes as a circulating medium, was their constantly changing value, increasing as the interest accrued up to the semi-annual payment of the interest, when a coupon was cut off, and the bond fell back at its face value with the small premium at which they sold in those days, added, which also increased and decreased according to the fluctuations of the market; and these fluctuations were the pulse of public confidence in the wisdom of our Government, too, and the fact that a Government bond is worth to-day at least sixteen per cent. premium, when they sold then at the average rate of 88-1000 of one per cent., seems to me a clean bill of health that will serve as a vindication of those acts meant for the general good, strong enough to refute the calumnies of even the most chronic croaker.

The legal tender notes received by the department for these seven-thirty notes were immediately paid out by the government, in settlement of demand liabilities then pressing, so that our circulation was increased, instead of being decreased by this legislation, in two ways: First, by the circulation of these legal tenders; and, second, by the increase of the National bank notes provided by our wise legislators expressly to prevent contraction of the currency, which alone was twenty per cent. over; in proof of which see law of January 14, 1865, "the resumption act," which says:

It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to redeem

the legal tender United States notes, in excess only of \$1,000,000, to the amount of eighty per centum of the sum of fractional bank notes.

After this act \$10,000,000 more United States notes were retired, and then on May 31, 1878, an act was passed forbidding the further retirement of the notes, and leaving \$346,681,016 in the field, which sum you will see carried in the reports of the Treasury up to the present time.

And this sum was enough; for so large an amount of United States notes issued as a wretched measure, were still outstanding and were an object of suspicion to the one, and were the basis of chimerical hope to the other. Europe did not have an overpowering confidence in this fiat money, and the other class began to talk of an unlimited supply without the trouble of earning it.

All other amounts of United States notes that have been received into the Treasury from various sources, such as internal revenue, customs, etc., have been paid out again and kept in circulation. What has been said about the hardship to those who had money to be redeemed in sums less than \$50 is worse than childish nonsense; because every bank from Maine to California did that for them: a mere accommodation without discount or anything else in the shape of a hardship. Col. Asa Matthews, First Comptroller of the Treasury under Harrison, who was a banker at that time, says he has done it hundreds of times, even in the smallest town where he lived. And it is equally preposterous that the poor man pays the rich man's interest. How, in the name of common sense, does he do it? He has no property to tax; his poll tax is but \$1 annually; and from a number of interviews with

leading dealers in domestic supplies, I learn that his supplies, far from being increased in cost, have been growing steadily cheaper. So he has not been paying a tax on his living either.

Thus you see, my dear long-suffering reader, this Greenback, Farmer's-Alliance, People's, Populist Labor Party cries "wolf! wolf!" when there isn't even a kitten in sight.

But while they have among them such champion liars as the Georgia editor who is quoted, it is no wonder they have the jim-jams, and see wolves and things. This great journalist dealing in hysterics too, draws a picture of a poor cotton planter's woes, in which he bases them all in the decrease of money per capita from 1868 to 1887. In the first mentioned year there were \$40 per capita in circulation, according to the above mentioned g. j., which he says dwindled down to \$5 in 1887. What are the facts?

I am rather fond of *facts*. In 1868 there was per capita, including the Pacific coast specie, \$18.39. In 1887 there was \$22.45, and there has been a steady increase ever since. There has also been a steady decrease of the public debt, which at the end of February, 1892 was, all told, \$972,282,890.61. Of this sum \$387,255,810.61 bears no interest, and the 4½ per cent. bonds have been converted into 2 per cent redeemable at the option of the government, so that the highest now is 4 per cent, which will become due in 1907. The 2 per cent bonds are the lowest that have been floated by any country on earth showing that the American credit is the best in the world.

If these facts and figures that I have painfully labored directly from our public documents did

not prove that these popuistic writers must have included the bonds in their enumeration, the admission of the great greenback apostle, General J. B. Weaver, in a conversation with Colonel William P. Hejburn, gives the whole matter away. Colonel Hejburn once asked him, after a speech in which I made pretty much the same statement, what I meant to include in this large sum, and if I counted the bonds also, and he replied that he did.

Now, if some people are so very obtuse as to require an object lesson to convince them, I have prepared a kindergarden illustration for them. Inquiring at the Treasury what had become of all those bonds, an officer of the department kindly offered to show me.

Down in the basement of the Treasury, in a long narrow room without opening except the door which we entered, lighted by gas and furnished with shelves from floor to ceiling, were those same seven-thirty notes. Done up in bundles, they filled every inch of space. I was permitted to handle some of them, taking my choice of the lot, and I found the most of them as clean, except from dust, that had accumulated upon the outside, as they were when they left the printing press. One batch of fiftys had been out about two years and half, and in that time, if they had been used as a circulating medium, some signs would have appeared, and as that is the smallest size, they, if any, would have been so used.

Sometimes those on the outside would look a little shabby from the handling in the office, but the inside notes of all were perfect, except a few that had suffered from contact with damp or others that had been hidden in a stove, perhaps, where they

accidentally burned, or under the carpet, from which life deposit they suffered contraction from the breath of mice. But as to any of the signs of business circulation, there was not an earthly bit of evidence, such as one very readily sees in the rooms where greenbacks and bank notes are sent for redemption after a few years' use.

When cornered by this statement from others, their Third party friends have declared that these bonds were as good as in circulation because they were made to do duty as the required reserve on the circulation, thus liberating the bank notes. Now, in the first place, as only *lawful money* could be used for this purpose the bonds were not available because they were not a legal tender.

It is true the compound interest notes, the three per cent. coin certificates, and the "one and two-car notes of 1863" were a legal tender, and might have been used that way; but that they never were so used the records of the Comptroller of the Currency amply demonstrate, and as an example of this I will present the report of 1868, as that is the first year in which this report was tabulated in a convenient form.

The required reserve of all the banks in existence in that year amounted to \$186,421,682, and the lawful money, United States notes and coin, which these banks had in reserve at that time was \$196,556,380, a cool \$10,334,698 more than was required without the use of the \$64,318,220, compound interest notes, the three per cent. certificates, etc., which were held as a simple investment, and these would have lacked \$22,043,462 of being sufficient had they been the only dependence.

The compound interest notes had but three years

to run, too, and by 1870 were all redeemed but little over \$2,000,000 that were for various reasons still left outstanding though, of course, having no interest bearing no interest.

The interest-bearing notes and the circulation notes were provided for in the very same act, and it was stated in the debates that the note should be used as an investment security, while the other would add to the volume of money in circulation.

And this was literally the result, for the easings were rare indeed where the compound interest notes changed hands. This happened in a few instances where the original recipients, needing the money, sold them to those who wished to hold them as an investment. A chaplain in one of the regiments, as an instance, regularly bought them whenever it happened that "the boys" were paid off in them; he wished to hold them for the interest, but the soldier had to use his money for family expenses.

This third party paints a soul-harrowing picture of the struggles of a victim of this "contraction," and to make matters worse, dumps him right on to the Grand Army of the Republic. If this poor man had such a hard time I pity him, but more for want of sense than anything else.

Any man who had been reared on a farm that didn't know better than to bank on the future price of wheat, because it was selling at the time for \$2 per bushel, in money that had not reached the gold standard, was a visionary indeed; even the little boy that plays marbles in the street knows better than that, for you will see that urchin holding a reserve for emergencies every time.

Business failures, like everything else in this

world, are the creations of such a variety of circumstances that it would take a book as big as Webster's Dictionary to exhaust the subject. As these particular business failures, we have seen that they were not caused by the lack of money at all events, as money was more plentiful than ever, and, according to my recollection, they did not happen anyhow; at least in no undue proportion to the new business ventures at that time. The war having ended, many of our boys in blue returned to business avocations, and at the same time immigration took on a new impetus, almost doubling in the seven years after 1866 over what it was in the seven years before. All these must work for money or starve, and we all know how a foreigner can work when he gets here, where the wages, as compared to his own land, seem princely. Added to this, the money at that time was of variable and unsettled value, the very thing Congress was trying to rectify. As during the war, at news of a victory for Grant, up went money along with the hats of all good citizens; at news of a Confederate triumph it went down, because the one increased the confidence of holders and the other decreased it; so after the war the movements of our law-makers were watched, and people began to speculate as to when we would resume specie payments; everybody who knew anything about money had serious doubts about a long continuance of irredeemable promises to pay even from the greatest Government on earth.

England with a war less aggravated than ours for many reasons took twelve years to accomplish resumption; this seemed a long time to those who believed in the merry jingle of metal money—with

its own intrinsic value that never changes, even with the destiny of nations, except by the immutable law of supply and demand. Then came a whisper, a tiny sibilant sound at first, but at last swelling into the proportions of a new party. The Greenback party was born, which declared a policy to keep right on printing money by the bushel, need be, regardless of the fact that money that sells by the bushel is not valuable. The people did not want to run the risk of having a greenback memorial like that dedicated to the holders of the Confederate Treasury notes, written on the back of one of them by Major S. A. Jonas of the Texas Brigade, beginning as follows:

Representing nothing on God's earth now  
 And naught in the waters below it,  
 As a pledge of the nation that's dead and gone,  
 Keep it, dear friend, and show it.

And the uneasiness became greater, and it was in 1877, when the time had lengthened out till our money was at a discount, that labor was cheapened.

As to the panic of 1873, that was in no sense brought about by financial legislation, but was caused, in the first place, by the undue expansion of railroad building in this country.

Jay Cooke & Co. were the first to fail, and the failure resulted entirely and exclusively from the intimate relations with the financiers of the Northern Pacific Railroad, which was then in process of construction, and of which they were the fiscal agents. The whole thing began in New York City in September, at a time when money is always comparatively scarce on account of the movement of crops.

Jay Cooke & Co. had loaned nearly all of their



money for the construction of the railroad, and were unable to recover it in season to meet the draughts which were made upon them by their correspondents, and were obliged to suspend.

This failure of a house which had been considered one of the richest and most powerful in the world was followed almost instantly by the failure of other prominent bankers in New York City, and a panic was in full force within seventy-two hours.

It was at that very time that we had our irredeemable currency too, a state of affairs that Congress was laboring to change. That they did change it is proven by the fact that our greatest prosperity began in '80 and '81, and has continued ever since.

So that this act, which they call "contraction," proves to have been expansion, not abnormal, such as the Greenbackers are clamoring for, but a healthy expansion, and has proven its right to be called what its formulators intended, the continuation of "an act to provide ways and means for the support of the Government."

## CHAPTER V.

### FOURTH ACHIEVEMENT—AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC CREDIT.

One of the noblest legislative acts ever passed by the American Congress was the act of March 11, 1869, entitled, "An act to strengthen the public credit." For it was thus our Hercules eased Atlas by taking the world on his own shoulders.

This act was made necessary by the fact that a class of malcontents had sprung up in this country openly proposing that our Government should set the example, for the first time in the history of nations, of a semi-repudiation, in a time of prosperity too, of the most solemn obligations to those who in the hour of need, aided us to save the country from disintegration. The faith of the Government to be disregarded, the great seal of the United States be smirched, and our flag dishonored, to save (or rather steal) out of the borrowed money due from us a few paltry dollars. And the worst of it is that we would not have saved the money either, for the act of dishonor in itself would have brought its own punishment, and the very first payment of our bonds in paper currency would have so impaired our credit that a United States note would not have been worth 40 cents on the dollar in our own markets nor the paper it was printed on in Europe.

True in the one clause of the act of Feb. 25, 1862, by which the first batch of 5-20 bonds were authorized, it was not expressly stipulated that these bonds should be paid in gold, because they had always paid them thus, and it had never been

the custom to mention the fact. In all the loans from Aug. 4, 1790, up to the war, no mention was made of the particular kind of money in which these obligations were to be redeemed. There was not even a mention of coin till the act of March 2, 1861, when \$35,364,450 of Treasury notes were issued, and the law says:

And the Treasury notes so issued under the authority herein given shall be received in payment for all debts to the United States when offered, and in like manner shall be given in payment for any sum due from the United States, when payment of that mode is requested by the person to whom payment is to be made, or for their par value in coin.

In an act approved July 17, 1861, a further issue of Treasury notes was made in exchange for coin. Again in the same act the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to exchange these Treasury notes for coin or for other Treasury notes, falling due, placing the two on the same basis.

These two were the only times that the word coin was mentioned in any of the negotiations prior to the act of February 25, 1862, and the next mention of coin is made in this act, itself. In this act several important measures became law. First the legal-tender notes were authorized (and by the way upon the vote for the legal-tender quality of those notes, the yeas were 93 and the nays 59, almost a strictly party vote, the Republicans for, and the Democrats against), an issue of \$200,000,000, which by subsequent acts was increased to \$450,000,000 was authorized. A pretty good load for any country to carry on its simple credit. It was in this act that the famous exception was made, for these notes were not receivable for duties, or interest on bonds.

Second the five-twenty bonds were issued \$515,-

000,000 which was increased by other issues. Now, as to there being no provision in the law making these bonds payable in gold, an intelligent interpretation is altogether in favor of it.

First, it had been the habit of the country to pay in gold and silver when demanded, although the act had ever expressly stipulated this; second, the value of gold at that time was but two per cent. more than par, and the chances seemed at that time that it would be back to its normal standard long before any of these bonds matured; third, it was expressly stipulated that the Secretary of the Treasury could sell them for coin, which presupposed that those buying them would receive like money in return for them if so desired; fourth, Section 5 of the same act provides that all import duties shall be paid in coin, etc., and the coin so paid shall be set apart as a special fund, to be applied, among other things, to the purchase or payment of one per centum of the entire debt of the United States, to be made within each fiscal year, the interest of this also to be applied the same way; and, fifth, as the same act that authorized this loan had made the first legal-tender, of which there were \$315,000,000, less than the amount of the five-twenties, the old demand notes not being legal-tender, our law-maker had no legal-tender notes to offer either for this or other obligations due and coming due.

Now, as these bonds were issued in 1862, redeemable at the pleasure of the United States after five years, they could have been taken up, at least a part of them, one would suppose, before 1871, when the first of them were redeemed, and I submit the question to the Populist Party, why didn't they do it if they were so anxious to enrich the bondhold-

s, as in the interim between 1867 and 1871 gold had been up to 40 cents premium, and at the time the first of these bonds were paid was again on a rapid descent, and the last were not paid till long after the resumption act had made all our moneys like value.

The act making anything else but gold or silver legal tender was strictly a war measure, sanctioned by the dire emergency that made it necessary. When the war was over and the country at peace no such necessity existed; and, but for the croakers who raised the question on a mere technicality of the law, and a usual one at that, nobody could ever have thought anything of returning to the old ways as speedily as possible after the war was over.

But the croakers croaked, and men learned in financiering became uneasy, lest even the law of precedent be disregarded. The holders of these bonds who had paid good money for them became uneasy also; and, mark you, those bondholders represented all classes, from the great bankers down to the frugal farmer, mechanic, or crippled soldier, who had laid a trifle by for the rainy day, and on the "faith of the United States," sealed by its great seal, thought the Government bonds the safest investment of all. What a shame to cheat these confiding people with a bit of paper of depreciated value! Would any People's Party house-keeper like it, when she lends her neighbor a drawing of coffee fresh browned and aromatic, to have that neighbor return to her, the full amount it is true, but of a quality from which the strength and flavor have vanished?

Well, that is just what these children of discontent

want our Government to do with the holders these bonds; and the yelping of the pack of human wolves compelled Congress to define its position in a sort of declaration of honesty, as it were, this "climax of audacity."

That in order to remove any doubt as to the purpose of Government to discharge all just obligations to the public creditors, and to settle conflicting questions and interpretations of the laws by virtue of which such obligations have been contracted, it is hereby provided and declared that the faith of the United States is solemnly pledged to the payment in coin, or its equivalent, of all the obligations of the United States not bearing interest, known as United States notes, and of all the interest-bearing obligations of the United States except in cases when the law authorizing the issue of a such obligation has expressly provided that the same may be paid in lawful money or other currency than gold or silver. But none of said interest-bearing obligations not already due shall be redeemed or paid before maturity, unless at such time United States notes shall be convertible into coin at the option of the holder, or unless at such time bonds of the United States bearing a lower rate of interest than the bonds to be redeemed can be sold at par in coin. And the United States also solemnly pledges its faith to make provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of the United States notes in coin.

This is the first act of General Grant's administration.

"Immediately upon his inauguration an extra session of Congress was called" by the old war hero. "The first bill presented, the first bill passed, the first act approved by President Grant," was an act to strengthen the public credit. (The quotations above are from the Populists, the rest from justice.) And it is for this act, made necessary because of the Munchausen theories of greenback dreamers, that they dare, with an impious pen, to desecrate the tomb of the man who protected our

untry from its enemies, and won for it the admiration of the whole world, General Grant, honored by all Europe.

It is for this act that they would sully the fair name of Morton, "the soldier's friend." He who saved his State from dishonor when its Democratic legislature refused the appropriations, because they "would not vote money to war on the South." When the Legislature adjourned, leaving the Government coffers empty, Oliver P. Morton obtained the necessary funds from Winslow, Lanier & Co., bankers, of New York, (who were agents of the State in managing the State debt) on his own personal responsibility, giving his note, as did some of his friends at his suggestion. Afterward the General Government authorized him to establish a cartridge factory at Indianapolis, advancing him money on his personal credit to do so, that he might by the sale of the cartridges meet the war expenses of the State. And after every battle in which Indiana troops were engaged the great war Government of that State sent aid immediately—physicians, nurses, and supplies—all on his own promise to pay. *And every dollar of it was paid.* Paid in money at war, too. No repudiation there. That Morton lived and died a poor man, after handling millions, out of which he could have grown rich, but of which every dollar is accounted for, is his best defense.

It is for this act to strengthen the public credit, that they would besmirch the living monument, reared even before death, by a life of unimpeachable integrity, to John Sherman.

The circumstantial evidence proves nothing in the face of such evidence to the contrary, and although circumstantial evidence has hung many an

innocent person, it is, in this case, but a figment of the populist brain, which they do not offer to substantiate by a single fact, merely adding a few promises and probabilities to their old scarecrow of 189 Congressional bankers, which I have already disproved by facts against mere assertion.

Another ghost which disturbs the Greenback haziness, is the spirit of injustice that they are shinning in the uncertain gloaming of a limited legal understanding, in the fact that the bonds are not taxed.

Now, it is not strange that they should have thought that at last something new had been found under the sun, for in discussing the act of February 25, 1862, not one of all the wise Solons, though by some people to know everything, referred to the fact that the question had been settled for them long before many of them were born.

In the case of *Weston et al. vs. The City Council of Charleston*, the Supreme Court of the United States, the highest tribunal in the land, decided that the States had no right to tax such a contract. In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice John Marshall said :

If the right to impose the tax exists, it is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corporation which imposes it, which the will of each State and corporation may prescribe. A power which is given by the whole American people for their common good, which is to be exercised at the most critical periods for the most important purposes, on the free exercise of which the interests certainly, perhaps the liberty, of the whole may depend, may be burdened, impeded, if not arrested by any of the organized parts of the Confederacy.

The tax on Government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money of



credit of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the Constitution. (Peters' Reports, 1829, vol. 2, page

and of course it would be a farce for the General Government to tax its own bonds, for in that case interest would have to be increased in order to induce anybody to take them at all, and so the Government would be merely taking money out of one pocket and putting it into the other, paying for the transfer in the bargain.

Should the day ever come that the hair-brained contingent of our National family, the Greenback party, gained its point, drawing the Government to a wild-cat financial system—or rather want of system—that day our Republic would become bankrupt, and its creditors, the moneyed power, would go down into the maelstrom of ruin, and in a natural sequence every wage earner in the country would keep them company; for capital is the ship upon which labor sails, and when the vessel goes down the passengers go also.

They make a great show of quoting from the leading Republicans in 1867, but fail to tell what the same men said under the conditions of 1869. It is only a fool who never changes his mind; but if Burton and Sherman, whom they abuse in the very same chapter as "fratricidal conspirators" are worthy of being quoted at all, let her give their other utterances when the basis of our currency had entirely changed.

## CHAPTER VI

### FEAT FIFTH—REFUNDING THE DEBT.

Hercules went on with his work, although Populist Juno would fain have turned Galant into his mother, into a weasel, or, in plain English, he subjected the constitutional majority to the will of a handful of Greenbackers. And his fifth feat was the refunding of the public debt, the fifth fallacy of the greenback chronology. And through their mouth-piece they roared: "Why in the dickens didn't they pay it?"

Well, my friends, I presume the chief reason was one cousin german to that which prevented the Boston spinster from getting married, "It was because she disapproved of marrying *per se*, on account of the scarcity of mediums." She didn't mean spiritual mediums, by the way, far from it. But women are a majority in Massachusetts.

In the year of 1870, when the refunding act was passed, the principal of the debt, bearing coin interest, was in all \$2,107,950,700, to be paid in gold or its equivalent. There was at that time in our Treasury, gold coin and bullion to the amount \$108,316,646. From this we must deduct the gold certificates for which the Government was liable amounting to \$32,084,800; the accrued interest to be deducted also was \$49,647,032 more, leaving but \$26,594,814, which was all the gold owned by the Government with which to pay the \$2,000,000,000 and over which we owed. Will some prestidigitator please step forward and perform the feat required by these wonderful people?

Hercules being ordered to destroy the lion that had fallen from the moon, and finding him invulnerable to any weapon, strangled him with his hands, and afterward wore his skin. And that is exactly what the American hero did.

In the very year that the most labored effort of the Populists to prove that we, as a nation, were not attempting to pay our debts, was in its latest edition, the year 1891, the interest-bearing debt, through these very funding operations, had dwindled down from the two billions and upward, mentioned above, to the sum of \$585,028,080, the highest interest rate of which was but four per cent., instead of six, and of which \$25,364,500 redeemable at the pleasure of the Government, bears at two per cent. interest; and under this act the annual interest, which was in 1870 \$124,261,149, had likewise dwindled to \$28,893,034. And the average rate at which the public debt has annually decreased since 1870 up to 1893, is \$51,621,268. We sold  $4\frac{1}{2}$ , and 4 per cent. bonds at par, for coin, and used the money so obtained to redeem the six per cent. bonds, thus saving in interest \$19,900,883.50 annually, of which amount \$14,290,455.50 arises from transactions since March 1, 1877.

In these refunding operations the same wise forethought was maintained by those executing the laws, as by those who framed them that every dollar might be used to the best advantage.

The Secretary of the Treasury was required by law to give three month's notice when bonds were called to allow time for their holders to adjust their business, which was according to agreement, and nothing but fair all around. In the most ordinary business transactions such an arrangement is con-

sidered an acquired right. And nobody lost a thing by it either, for the Secretary generally managed to call the bonds at a time when he knew there would be collections from revenue and other moneys coming in, so that in all the ten years it took to complete these operations, his expenses ran over to the wrong side of the account but once, and then the loss was compensated twice over the saving for that one year of the annual interest.

And yet the enemies of the Government have been harping on this ever since, talking about double interest, etc., and resolutely closing their eyes to the immense decrease. "There are none blind as those who *will* not see."

They will not see that the interest which was \$124,261,149 annually in 1870 had been reduced, when the Republicans retired from the control of the Government, in 1893, to \$22,386,543, a saving annually of \$101,874,606, a result of the refunding operation coupled with purchases and redemptions of bonds with the surplus revenues, a part of the present debt bearing but two per cent. interest, and redeemable at the option of the Government instead of running for fifty years as represented by the Greenback element.

All these good works have been accomplished in spite of the "untiring vigilance in our Nation's Congress of the 'indomitable' Weaver, Gillett and the 'devoted' DeLamartyr," who are, thank God, no longer in Congress to air their demagogic and obstruct wise legislation by filibustering tactics that cost the Government more than all the expense of the refunding operations.

When the funding bill was before Congress there was a division of opinion as to whether the new

ans should run five, ten, and fifteen years, or ten, fifteen, and thirty years, and it is a curious fact that those who are now the bone and sinew, nerve, and muscle of the Greenback party insisted upon the longer period, which was finally agreed upon for two reasons. First, because it was thought that the new bonds, with reduced interest rate, would not sell at par unless running for a longer period; and, second, because our legislators, not being prophets, could not possibly foresee the unexampled prosperity of the country under a protective tariff that was then scarcely in operation, sanguine as were their expectations, and were therefore not very hopeful of being able to redeem them sooner. They knew that England's debt had not decreased appreciably to the naked eye in the last forty years, and taking that great nation as an example, it seemed preposterous to expect to redeem the whole of our debt in less than thirty years.

And now behold the facility with which the greenback theory can turn somersaults, for this writer turns a double somersault—metaphorically I mean—when she refers to the funds deposited with the National banks, of which, she declares, they have free use, as a part of the available cash that is being kept from the people, seemed to forget that by this very means a great part of it is kept in circulation, and that the bonds owned by the banker aforesaid are a part of the very debt she would pay.

This money was not coin, to begin with, but the circulating medium of the time, which was paper, and therefore not available in payment of the bonds; for the banks in question were compelled by statute to receive at par all kinds of National currency bills by whatever association issued that

had been paid for internal revenue, or for loans stocks. And they were not granted its *free* use the second place, for although no interest in money was required, the associations designated as sub-depositories were required to render service for their privilege, which more than covered any profit they could get out of it, and in fact the only clear advantage they received, was the confidence of their patrons, which was naturally strengthened by the fact that the associations were the financial agents of the Government. The dreadful bugaboo of the people paying said interest is "slush" of the same quality that runs all through the Greenback doctrine.

There was no interest in the case except that paid by those who borrowed the money from the banks for their personal use, and it is common for people to pay interest on their own debts I believe; but in this case the interest paid acted in a double capacity for it was all the pay the banker received for his services to the Government, and to cover the outlay such services engendered; so that after all he merely used the Government money as an agent of the Government in making payments to public creditors.

These associations could not lend money out of this fund till the deposits were above a stated sum which they kept as a reserve, and the interest on that loaned was seldom if ever more than enough to pay for the labor and expense of the transportation of monies to the sub-treasury as required by the secretary. And the Government by this arrangement saved the trouble and expense of shipping the money as fast as collected all the way to Washington, Chicago, or some of the other sub-

treasuries, these bank depositories being chosen in places remote from such conveniences.

Besides all this, these associations are compelled to give security by the deposit of United States bonds for the safe keeping and prompt payment of the public money deposited with them, and for the faithful performance of their duties as financial agents of the Government; and every day they must transfer to the subtreasury all monies received in excess of the face value of the bonds held in trust by the treasurer of the United States, to secure public deposits.

Thus, instead of hiring salaried officers to handle money and attend to this necessary work, our wise laws have fixed it so that this cash, that would otherwise be idle, is kept in circulation, and made to pay its own expenses, with the use of the convenient bank check, instead of cumbersome cash.

Thus you see, it is by the very same double-ender arithmetic with which they made the bonds increase the bulk of greenbacks, under the Act of April 12, 1866, that these Populists again attempt "to eat their pie, and have it, too," by counting the deposits, after they had already counted the bonds that secured them. If these facile people can find means to make a man pay himself for his own labor, especially after all the money has been created, they can take the laurels of our Hercules, and we will turn him into a weasel, along with his mother. And if they should wait till our debt is two centuries old, like England's, I do not think they would find another back-action hand-spring equal to the one they advise.

But the bonded indebtedness of our country will never reach to quarter the age of that of its re-

spected sire, for hitherto it has decreased with regularity equal to that with which the Greenback counts double, and by the natural result of this decreasing arithmetical progression, we will come to the end by and by, in spite of the issue of bonds by the present administration.

This oft mistaking party makes another mistake, also; for it is not the bonded debt of England that fills her lanes and byways with the ignorant and degraded toilers, but a lack of the same wise protective tariff which—please God, to Whom let us earnestly pray to protect us from the present midsummer madness of 1894 of our Democratic legislators—will compel the foreigner to pay our debt for us without taxing our own people, who have been growing every year more and more prosperous under its beneficent influence; and we can well afford to pass the pension bills, at which our Populist sister sneered, quite forgetful of the poor soldier that she served up with cap sauce in some of her diatribes against their best friends, the Republicans. The Republican party is willing to shoulder this “pension fraud” and “educational fraud” and all the rest, even the “coast defenses,” which may be found useful when least expected.

Why, we have an object lesson right in our midst, of the advantage of taxing the outsider, instead of the citizen. The Cherokee Nation long ago adopted that principle and are growing rich in consequence.

I was talking to a most intelligent lady of that race, who is a large cattle raiser. You would all know her were I to give her name; and she told me so. I asked her what taxes she paid, and was



amazed to hear that none of her property was taxed, nor, in fact, the property of any other Cherokee citizen. "Why, how do you get money to run the government?" I asked. "We collect it from the white men who trade with us," was her calm reply.

But we have higher authority still for the wisdom of the protective tariff. Let me point to the teachings of the great philanthropist Christ, when he said to Peter:

"What thinkest thou, Simon; of whom do the kings of the earth take custom or tribute? of their own children or of strangers?"

And Peter, answering; "Of strangers." Jesus said, "Then are the children free."

If the Indians are the lost tribes of Israel, as some suppose, they are only following their ancient custom, it seems.

In the mean time, here is another indication of the superiority of our system over that of England. Statistics show that the savings banks of nine States alone have increased their deposits \$628,000,000 in nineteen years, while the savings banks of England have only increased theirs \$350,000,000 in thirty-four years.

As to the mortgage story, that is almost too much of a chestnut to notice, for it has been proven over and over that mortgages are decreasing instead of increasing in most of the States as compared to the increase of population and value of real estate.

It has been proven also that a mortgage indebtedness is far oftener a sign of prosperity than otherwise by the fact that as business increases mortgages are sure to increase also. With this increase in business we have more merchandise that we

have money, so we have credit money represented by the mortgages, and many undertakings are carried through now that never were dreamed of in olden time when a mortgage was thought a great evil than the yellow fever, and when people were content to plod along with all the money they possessed tied up in the house they lived in, and therefore bringing in no income.

The bright man of this progressive age takes advantage of the trust he can command with his real estate security, gets the money to go into business for himself instead of slaving for somebody else and gets rich. Quite often, too, with the mortgage still unpaid on his house, because the dividends his business brings him are too great to yield by drawing the sum out of his business only to satisfy a sentimental desire to have the home clear. He is as much master of the house as if it were clear; he can exchange, improve, rent, or sell it just the same; he pays no more taxes or insurance because of the mortgage, and the interest he pays can be doubly covered by the profits out of his investment.

Looking over the objects of the mortgage in the indebtedness of some of the States, according to the last census, I find "purchase money," for many a man gets his home in the first place by giving a mortgage for deferred payments; "improvement business, to buy more land, to buy farm stock, to help sons, etc., while out of whole counties but one or two poor fellows would be found that had borrowed money for family expenses. Now and then we find one engaged in speculation; and occasionally a loss from indorsing for a "friend," but as a general thing the mortgage is the harbinger of good times.

## CHAPTER VII.

### SIXTH DEED OF VALOR—THE COINAGE ACT.

When Hercules, in destroying the Centaurs, accidentally slew his former preceptor, Chiron, to whom the others had fled for protection, he had him translated among the constellations; and just so with this modern hero.

A revision of our coinage becoming necessary, an act to that effect became a law Feb. 12, 1873. This is the half-dozen-th fallacy according to the pistle of the apostle St. Greenback, who makes out of it another so-called contraction that failed to contract anything, not even the weight of the dollar.

The silver dollar of the United States has a unique history, and its ups and downs are equal to the Geenbacker's arithmetic. It was first coined in 1793, its weight in standard silver 416 troy grains; but it did not make a very great show, as only \$204,791 were coined in the first three years. For ten years more it hung on by its eyelids, as it were, till in 1805, when it was suspended, only \$321 being issued that year. We see no more of it after that till in 1836, when it appears again in a condition decidedly the worse for its battle with the two decades that had intervened, in an issue of \$1,000; and that seemed to be the last three, for again it disappeared till after the act of January 18, 1837, had authorized a new issue of dollars with weight reduced to 412½ grains of standard silver.

Of these none were issued till 1839, when \$300 tipped the shell; and after that until 1853 the dol-

lar fluctuated, reaching into the thousands final while the minor coins, coined by act of a Democratic Congress, began to supersede it, thus practically demonetizing it; till in 1858 the dollar disappeared once more, leaving the minor issues largely increased. In 1859 the issue begins again and continues till 1873, dividing the honors with the new trade dollar that year and then disappearing for four years more. For the silver contained in each of these coins was worth more than one hundred cents, and most of them had been melted and sold as bullion, so there were very few left in this country. And even those few were amply protected by the law itself, for it reads: "That this act shall not be construed to affect any act done, right accrued, penalty incurred, under former acts, but every such right is hereby saved, etc." And thus the old woman who had a standard dollar hidden away in a stocking could serenely enjoy the knowledge that it was still legal-tender, as much as it had been before. It was absolute nonsense, therefore, to talk of our silver dollar of 412½ grains being demonetized by England till it was not worth as much as the gold dollar, when we had none in England; for even the trade dollar did not journey thither. Up to this time the whole issue of the "dollar of the daddies" was but \$8,012,338. Not very many dollars to be demonetized after all.

In fact, we were on a paper basis anyhow; not a dollar of specie had been in circulation for twelve years except that on the Pacific coast and in Texas, and the dollars that had been issued were only for the convenience of foreign trade; and in this particular the American 412½-grain, with its bullion value greater abroad than its face value, had the

hit the Mexican dollar with its 418 grains of silver. So, when the revision of the coinage was going on, the people of the Pacific coast asked for something that might stand a better chance with the people of China and Japan, where the Mexican dollar was a great favorite.

The Legislature of California sent a petition to that effect, and on motion of her Senators the old dollar was dropped, and a trade dollar, with two more grains of silver than the Mexican, was issued, to be used in foreign trade alone. This trade dollar was also worth less than the silver in it; but it was hoped that the profit accruing from the trade caught by it, would compensate the loss. *This act was passed by the unanimous vote of both Houses of Congress, without the faintest objection from any one of either party*—not even from the grating Greenbacker that had begun to chirp among them. Does it not seem a little late in the day for them to begin now?

The trade dollar was never in circulation anywhere more than the old dollar had been for some time, and not as much, for it did not even circulate on the Pacific coast, because it was not a full legal tender even at first, and the five dollars worth, allowed it when created, had been revoked before the resumption of specie payments. Thus nobody could receive it for domestic supplies, and as it was soon ascertained that the Chinese and Japs, who are inclined to be wedded to their traditions, would not take it either, and, as it was found also, that certain of our people had secured the right to use it by representing that they wanted it for foreign trade, and then were unlawfully using it in paying off the working people in their employ,

all these things operated to secure its withdrawal and the restoration of the old Standard dollar before the resumption act went into force. Just how it managed to agitate business circles, therefore, is hard to discover.

The Greenbacker says it destroyed the monetary quality of silver, but it was hard to destroy that which did not exist. There were \$25,000,000 of specie in circulation on the Pacific coast, and none in the Treasury when the coinage act was passed. Of this less than one-fifth was silver; and during the four years that the standard dollar was dropped from coinage, there were \$75,904,692.70, of silver coined at our various mints. This seems a quite a kind of destruction. He says, also, that the object was first to prevent the payment of the bonds, and second, to increase their value, because it added to the value of the gold in which these bonds were to be paid. Now let us see if this was the case.

In 1873 a gold dollar was worth \$1.14, while an ounce of silver was worth in London \$1.298. In 1874 the gold dollar had dropped to \$1.11, and silver was worth \$1.278, so that notwithstanding the fact that silver had declined as it had been doing in a fluctuating manner since 1860, the gold dollar had declined also, and the balance was in favor of silver, which was worth 11 cents more in gold dollars in 1874 than it was in 1873.

I am informed by the director of the mint that this was no evidence of the decline of the value of gold; but that the greenbacks and legal tender notes had appreciated in value. Thus proving that the fluctuations in the value of the greenback were due to the pulse of the world's confidence in our Government, as I have previously claimed, and

at all the misfortunes of the man who invested greenback currency when it was depreciated in value were no fault of those who were doing their best to restore that confidence; but, if anybody's fault at all, was the fault of his own mistaken judgment.

Mr. Leach further states that a given amount of gold would be paid for at any mints in the world at the same rate for the last fifty years.

The silver in the dollar of 1837 was worth no more in the markets of that period than that contained in the trade dollar of 1872, according to the market of 1873, although the latter coin weighed seven and one-half grains more, and the lack of the legal-tender quality was all that made the difference, and this was not at all a necessary quality for the purpose of foreign trade.

The rise and fall of the price of silver, as in gold, was occasioned by the supply and demand like anything else, and the downward tendency of silver did keep almost even pace with the increase of production. The amount of silver produced in the United States from 1834 to 1844 was \$14,000,000, while in 1873 alone it was \$71,750,000. And all this time the price per ounce had fluctuated with the ebb and flow of the production; and although the market value of gold is fixed by the markets of the whole world, history proves that even that royal metal may be moved by the same power, and at the time its over-production made it of less value relatively than silver.

At all events, gold did not increase in value after 1833, for it went steadily down, and the circulating medium did not decrease in the United States either, for there was an increase in the circulating

paper money, the general stock of 1873 being \$74,445,610, while in 1874 it was \$781,024,781, in spite of the retirement of bank notes, and fractional currency, with \$25,000,000 of specie on the Pacific coast added in both cases. There was, however, a very slight decrease per capita for a few years, because of the sudden boom given to immigration by the prosperity of our country under our protective tariff increased the population faster than money increased, till resumption sent a flood of gold and silver to accelerate the pulse of the Nation. The aggregate of immigrants for the decade immediately preceding, which ended with 1870, had been 2,314,824, an annual average of 231,482; while the decade in which these silver changes took place, ending with 1880, the aggregate was 2,812,191, an average number of 281,219.

But in 1878 the old dollar was restored with coinage limits, not exceeding \$4,000,000, nor less than \$2,000,000 per month, and under this law in a period of twelve years we issued 400,000,000 silver dollars fifty times the number that had been coined prior to 1873; so that the "scheme" consummated by those "civilized brigands" has resulted in making the money of the common people more plentiful than ever. The entire issue of silver dollars up to 1873 was but \$6,165,738; and the whole issue of treasury dollars was but \$35,965,924, with \$296,600 of the old dollars; while the issue of 1890 alone was \$38,040,004, to say nothing of the minor coins. And the coinage of 1890 circulates, too, which the former did not.

The Third Party prophet tells another of his fairy stories about the English capitalists sending one Ernest Seyd to this country to act as god-father



the demonetization of our silver and declares at the original draft of the bill was in his handwriting, giving Judge Kelley as her authority. As her authority in this, like the poor fellows whom she attacks in her fifth chapter, and those she quotes in most other places, is dead, he can not speak for himself; but Senator Sherman, who was chairman of the Finance Committee at that time, and therefore chairman of the Conference Committee, says the statement is not true; and from Mr. E. O. Beech, I have received the following:

The coinage act of 1873 was prepared by John Jay Knox, then deputy comptroller of the currency, who was assisted in the preparation of it by Dr. H. R. Linderman, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury. The bill was prepared with great care, and after voluminous correspondence and numerous consultations with officers of the mint and others. The assertion that Ernest Seyd had anything to do with the preparation of the bill, or with its passage, is not borne out by the records, and it is not believed that he was even consulted in the matter.

At all events they must have given him a very long range if they did consult him, for it has lately been discovered that he was not even in the country at that time; and if he had been, he was himself a most earnest bimetallist, and had written several books on the subject, favoring the use of both metals as money.

So much for that, now for the wheat story. First and foremost, India has the wide world for her wheat market, and would be apt to kick vigorously against a 20 per cent. discount on the dollar she received in payment; and as gold went down along with the silver, England missed her 10 per cent. also in America; and she can have the supplies of this country only when she pays a fair

price for the same. In fact, I think the lady might have had a generous slice of English plum pudding for her supper when she had that vision of murder, insanity, suicide, divorce, drunkenness etc., and thus got the English pence-earner in the wrong country.

And the payment of the bonds was not even retarded in the end any more than the gold, in which they were paid, increased; for the redemption of the public debt went on with a general increase, though with the usual fluctuations, with the result I have rehearsed in the preceding chapter.

As to what the Rothschilds, Hazzard and other London financiers did according to these croakers, though, to begin on, the Rothschilds were not in possession of several hundred millions of the English bonds—it would be no new thing, if true; for no matter what party is in power here or what public policy is being discussed, England always interferes, because she knows “which side of her bread is buttered,” and our growing independence is a matter of serious moment to her, for, while we get along excellently well without her, she cannot do without us. Sometimes her advice is good; then we take it, because it is no new thing for no matter to be to our mutual international advantage and only a demagogue of the most rabid type would think it incumbent on our patriotism to snub our neighbor then; especially as we are masters of the situation.

If England could set her own prices on the goods she sells in our markets, adding the duty paid to our Government to the price she compels our people to pay to her, would she go to all this trouble and expense to influence our legislators in the

financial legislation, or the tariff, either? It is absurd.

The *London Standard* was about right when it said that had the Mills bill passed it would have been worth £100,000,000 per annum to the British manufacturers. That is just \$486,650,000 brought over to the American profit side by our protection measure; please take notice by the way. Why should it be worth a cent to them, one way or another, if we paid their duty for them?

If England risked half a million on our coinage legislation she is not the first who has speculated and lost, as all are sure to do who expect to find sleep such men as Morrill, Sherman, Allison, Aldrich, and others who were at the head of our finances.

As to the price of silver in London, it has gone down more rapidly since the restoration of the legal dollar than it did before, falling from \$1.298 in 1873 to \$1.04633 in 1890, which is a natural result of the increased supply and the cheaper processes of its production. For even Greenbackers can not charge demonetization upon it now, when all our money is of equal value, although the silver purchasing clause of the Sherman law has been repealed by the present Congress; a step thought necessary by the present administration, for two reasons: first, with the improved output of our mines, the supply was increasing tremendously, and: Second, the demand was decreasing in the Indian and Asiatic countries to such an extent that our Treasury would soon have been buried under its own wealth of silver without the co-operation of Europe. And that it is hoped this step on our part will soon compel to come to us; and on my own responsi-

bility I promise that the Republican Party will right by silver, in common with every other American industry.

In the coinage of nations the United States issues more silver than any other, except India that coins no gold. But Great Britain, Australia, Germany and Russia coin more gold than the United States.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### SEVENTH TRIUMPH—THE RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS.

I stand with my head uncovered and reverently bent, before the matchless wisdom that so guided our affairs through all these perils that not even this last, most difficult and delicate operation harmed the people, though the seventh Populist 'conspiracy.'

All our trade had adjusted itself to a paper basis. On that manufacturers were producing; and merchants buying and contracting for goods; farmers operating their crops; artisans contracting for work; and the poor depending on the daily wage that could not bear a discount, a wage not what it was under the McKinley law, although higher than at any time before the war.

But things could not go on so. Ten years had elapsed since the close of the war; our people had almost forgotten how silver and gold money looked, and our paper money was wearing its credit out abroad, for no country can stand a paper basis long.

Hercules being commanded to gather the golden apples in the garden of Hesperides, slew the sleepless dragon guarding them, and bore the treasure away in triumph.

The dragon that hindered us from gathering this golden fruit was the depreciated value of the circulating paper money with which our people had been doing business; for although gold had been steadily declining since 1864, it still bore a prem-

ium, which—gold being the standard of valuation—of course reduced the value of paper that was merely a substitute, and not even its representative since gold was not paid out for it.

No one doubted the desirability of raising the standard of our money value by calling gold and silver into circulation. But dare we do it?

For those out of debt, the good would be unmingled with evil; and for those receiving salaries or annuities the change would be doubly advantageous. But for the debtor who would have to pay his debt increased by the increased value of money, all would be a total loss, unless he were the owner of property behind his debt, that would appreciate in value also. All this must be taken into consideration, for the change must be made. Already had it been too long delayed, and every year would make the matter more difficult.

But mark the strength of our Hercules even in this, his most dangerous exploit.

The first step taken was a speedy coinage of minor silver coins, which were gradually issued in place of the fractional currency, beginning this operation the very next year, the last batch being taken up in 1878.

The next step was to make the coinage of gold free, thus inducing an increase of gold money.

Next the limit to National banking operations was removed, and it was so arranged that for every legal-tender United States note redeemed, a bank-note should be issued, with a margin left of \$300,000 of the United States notes outstanding. Thus passing the danger line of fiat money without contracting anybody's purse strings. But the climax of prudence resides in the fact that the time

for all these operations, when the tug of war should be reached by the Secretary of the Treasury redeeming the outstanding legal-tender notes was extended over the period of four years from the passage of the act, which was approved March 3, 1875, and consummated January 1, 1879, thus affording ample time for the people to erect storm defences. By this means business men were able to adjust their business to the new order: debtors could compound with creditors; manufacturers, merchants and farmers could so grade their prices as to escape loss, and had no need to cut down the wages of employés: in fact, the wages were increased because the money paid was worth more.

According to the Populist statement, the reader who is not posted would think that the Government, in order to buy the coin necessary for these transactions, had tumbled another great debt, in the shape of interest-bearing bonds, upon the heads of a long suffering people. But the fact is that the bonds used here were those created by the Act of July 14, 1870, when the debt was refunded, and which has already been abused enough, in all conscience.

Let me say it again, our debt, under the Republican administration, decreased steadily instead of increasing; it is a good thing to reiterate, since those who misrepresent us, have been ringing the changes on this false statement in a hundred different keys.

Another good thing to repeat in this connection, in view of these repetitions of falsehoods, is that living did not increase, labor did not decrease, and the amount of money in circulation was greater than ever before.

And yet another matter it is well to repeat is that among the cash which is represented as being kept away from the people, by being locked up in the Treasury, is the \$100,000,000 of gold that was kept inviolate to the last by the Republican administration, to secure the value of certain money in circulation, and thus prevent possible loss to the people as that which represents it is nothing but paper otherwise.

I do not know where these people get their figures, but certainly not from statistical publications.

They say that the money all told in the United States for the last fiscal year (presumably 1887, as the second edition of the book before me was published in 1888,) was \$1,394,781,000; money in the Treasury January, 1876, was \$601,102,318.19, and had increased since that date at least \$100,000,000, with \$369,475,385 more in the banks, making a grand total locked up of \$1,070,577,703, leaving among the people the paltry sum of \$324,103,297; which, divided among 60,000,000 people, gave a per capita of \$5.40.

Now, the facts are these: In 1887, the general stock of money in the United States was \$1,900,442,672; that in the Treasury was \$582,903,529; in circulation \$1,317,539,145. The population was 58,680,000. Circulation per capita, therefore, \$22.45.

They state farther that, at the close of the war, we had in circulation about \$2,000,000,000, including three per cent. Treasury certificates, compound interest notes, and seven-thirty bonds, all of which entered into the circulating medium; and that this divided among a population of 40,000,000 gave a per capita of about \$50.

The truth is that at the close of the war in 1865,



we had exactly \$714,702,995 in circulation, a per capita of \$20.57.

There never has been in the history of this country a circulation of \$50 per capita, or any other country, save France, where they have no banks, except in the principal cities, and there, where a bank is made of the pocketbook, the circulation per capita is about \$57.

The highest ever known here is the circulation of February 1, 1892, when it was \$24.70. The Republicans went out, leaving it almost double what it was when they came in—namely, \$13.85 in 1860. But it is already going down under Democratic rule, being but \$24.19, on the 1st of August, 1894. A per capita based upon the entire money of the country, in 1865 was but \$22.16, and in 1887 it was \$32.39.

Another reiteration is found necessary right here. None of the bonds mentioned above were in circulation at that time. A man would have been a fool to pay out for daily expenses a note bearing accrued interest, especially compounded interest, for these bonds became too valuable in a short time to be parted from lightly.

Indeed I am weary of the necessity of refuting over and over again the misstatements that are repeated on every page of this Populist literature (?) and it is almost too much to hear them "pointing with pride" and exclaiming:

"With these figures before us who can doubt the real cause of business stagnation, and the rapid increase of pauperism and crime?" It is not stated where the paupers and criminals were at that time. We all know where they are now, since the fuss these Populists made have helped to down the best friends of the people, the Republicans.

But with the true figures before us, it is not hard to find the cause of the opposite. Since the Resumption Act we have in the United States a kind of money the people want. There are gold and silver, nickel and copper, and paper money in many forms—United States notes, National-bank notes, gold certificates, silver certificates, and Treasury notes, all at par with gold—and there is no danger of the crisis so airily suggested for our country if we continue our sound financial system and the American protective tariff; and there is no reason why we should not be even more prosperous than ever before. The man who carries ashes from city back yards makes more money than the journeyman carpenter did before the war, and gets food and clothing cheaper, too. The Resumption Act increased the circulation \$154,750,435 the very first year, and it has been going on ever since. And the farmer gets a whole dollar for his dollar's worth of produce now; and if he has a mortgage on his farm there is no reason why he shouldn't pay with his produce protected by the tariff and most of his most necessary supplies free. If he holds Government bond, as a great many of our middle class do, notwithstanding the story that the Populists tell, he can receive his gold interest, which will help, although interest in gold now is not so much to him as it was in the past, owing to the efficient legislation of the last thirty years, which put gold on a level with other money. And another thing he can have which is better than gold. He can have the proud consciousness that he lives in a country whose credit belts the globe, and though failure of crops now and then may embarrass him he knows that he can retrieve his fortunes when the

cheap alien labor across the border cannot understand him.

We can take care of the men, too, who risked their lives to save the country, even if the bond-holder waits, with his interest cut down till his bonds are far less valuable than of yore. We can educate the people also; and build the coast defences that have been so lately needed on the frosty shores of the Behring Sea. We can improve the country in every way, at all points, mentally, morally, physically and geographically; for the debt is in a condition to be met at maturity, and our tariff duties, if left alone, will furnish the means even while it protects our industries.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE POISONED TUNIC—INFLATION OF THE CURRENCY.

Like a dog baying at the moon, it is so easy to on one's haunches and howl about legislation that one knows nothing about. The greenbacker grumbled when nobody had any gold but the bondholders, and he grumbled when it was so arranged that everybody might take his choice of gold, silver, nickel, copper, or paper. It is hard for an outsider to see where the conspiracies came in under the foregoing acts, but according to the lexicon of greenback ethics it seems to have become a conspiracy to be honest, or they never would connive at a semi-repudiation of the debt we owe to those who succored us in the hour of our greatest need. And taking the little book previously referred to as an example, I should think they regard it as something of a conspiracy to tell the truth, for they would blush to tell such a whopper as that comprised in its story. And then to cap the climax of impiety by dedicating it to a poor man who is dead and cannot remonstrate.

But, it is pretty evident that the author did not dig her facts (?) out of the tomes and annals and statistics for herself, as I did, and so we will excuse her charitable and believe that some bold, bad man misled her as to the data on which her clever little book was constructed. Indeed she confesses as much in the preface to her twelfth edition, where she declares that for years she sat a disciple at the feet of Colonel B. S. Heath, whoever he is; and would advise her, the next time she occupies a like

position to anyone for such a very long time, to see that her teacher performs a certain ablutionary process known to the Dunkards; as the lack of this precaution may be the cause of that strong odor of falsehood. For I accepted the lady's invitation to search the official records, and every figure and fact contained in this book is copied from them *verbatim et liberatim*.

I have made no attempt to reply to any of the quoted utterances, because in this great world, full not only of various minds, but of changing minds also, he would take a big contract who attempted to account for any man's opinions, past, present, or future. For instance, in the discussion of the legal tender there were a variety of opinions, and even the financiers of the country were divided in opinion, and, according to Mr. Fessenden, you could not count on their remaining of the same mind even for a day, citing as an instance that "he was advised very strongly one day by a leading financial man, to oppose the legal-tender clause, and that on the same day he received a note from a friend of this man's telling him that he couldn't get along without it."

Fessenden showed the note to the man who had just been declaiming against the measure; and he, expressing surprise, went home, and the next day telegraphed that he had changed his mind and now thought the act necessary. But the same day the friend whose note had been shown to him, wrote a second note saying that he had changed his mind. And they were two of the most eminent financial men in the country.

A circumstance like this should teach one to be slow in accusing men who happen to think differ-

ently from himself, on finance at least, of dishonesty.

But this legal-tender note, of which the Greenback party were so fond, seemed to meet a very undivided disapproval except as a war measure, even from those who championed its cause, and Secretary Chase showed how it was regarded by the administration. Said he:

I feel a great aversion to making anything but coin a legal tender in payment of debts. It has been my anxious wish to avoid the necessity of such legislation. It is, however, present impossible, in consequence of the large expenditures entailed by the war and the suspension of the banks, to procure sufficient coin for disbursements, and it has, therefore, become indispensably necessary that we should resort to the issue of United States notes.

The amount was restricted, too; the utmost limit to be issued, \$150,000,000; \$50,000,000 to be in lieu of the "demand notes," and the amount of the two kinds of notes together was at no time to be over \$150,000,000.

Why all this care lest it increase too fast, as money is a good thing, if this was good money? I will tell you.

The best friends of the country regarded this limit as the danger mark, beyond which it would not be well to pass, for there is always financial disaster in inflated values.

This is the poisoned tunie which the Greenback party has attempted to place on the shoulders of our hero; but this modern Hercules is far wiser than his illustrious namesake, and he firmly refuses to wear it.

Take it all in all, I like this little book passing well, for it will set people to thinking, and it will do more, it will compel them to overhaul the rec-

ords, and that will result in the vindication of the Republican party of every time. The party of advancement and good morals; of the tariff and good homes; of finance and good money.

Now for a recapitulation in a kind of "in short" style.

The act of Feb. 25, 1862, made the United States notes a legal tender for all debts, with the wise exception of duties on imports and interest on the United States bonds. Without the latter exception we could not have borrowed money enough in Europe for a skirmish with a squad of mosquitoes; and with the former exception we made the foreigner pay for his own gold. For the coin, paid on the imports, was set aside by section 3 of the act as a special fund to pay this interest and also 1 per centum of the entire debt of the United States to be made within each fiscal year. The remainder to be paid into the Treasury.

By the National banking act the cumbersome bonds were utilized for circulation. In themselves they were not available, as I have shown, for they were not only large in denomination but most of them were about a quarter of a yard square. The banking notes merely represented them and were secured by them, thus making a good exchange from the State bank notes that were little better than fiat money.

The act of April 12, 1866, did not contract the currency; to the contrary, it increased the circulation, and really rescued the country from the many disasters that resulted from the sudden influx of our returned soldiers, and an increased immigration, into our business channels—when, with so many starting new ventures, some had inevitably to fail—

followed by the failure of Jay Cooke & Co. (the very men for whose benefit all this iniquity was being accomplished, according to these Populists) who failed, however, because of other matters entirely.

The Credit Strengthening Act was an act of simple justice, paying the man who risked his money on the perils of war, in the kind of money that precedent had given him a right to expect; we thus only made a virtue of necessity, however, for he would never have loaned us the money to be paid in an uncertain currency, in such uncertain times.

The bonds were not taxed, because it was unconstitutional to do so, and useless, too.

The Refunding Act saved to the country millions in interest on debts we were not able to pay without an enormous issue of fiat money, which would have been repudiation, and, therefore, bad faith toward creditors. It also would have been unwise in the debtor who may want to borrow again, and in the near future, too, unless we speedily attend to our coast defenses.

The Coinage Act did not demonetize silver, for it was not a circulating medium, and besides was already practically demonetized, because the silver dollar was worth more than a gold dollar. The silver dollar had never cut much of a figure in our business transactions, and the trade dollar was not meant for circulation here, but was issued in the hope of furthering American interests in China and Japan by taking the place of the Mexican dollar. When it failed in that, and certain of our citizens took advantage of its coinage, which was almost without expense, and by misrepresentations unlawfully produced it for domestic use, the law was repealed.



Resumption, approved January 14, 1875, and consummated January 1, 1879, brought our finances back to the smooth, even waters of a specie basis, through breakers that seemed to threaten wreck and disaster, so that even those who finally accomplished it trembled for the result. But by the plan of gradual operations, time was given to all to reef their sails till the dangerous channel was passed, and our ship of state proudly unfurled her sails, out upon the ocean of a most unexampled prosperity, an unimpeachable credit, and above all a clear escutcheon.

The Republican party that came into power on the eve of the rebellion, burdened by a debt bearing large interest, left by its predecessors with an empty treasury, and yet saved this country from the mad treason of a part of our own inconsiderate citizens, and brought them back, with fatted calf accompaniment, has given them a system of finance unsurpassed in the whole civilized world.

I have tried my best to treat this matter honestly if not altogether seriously; and indeed some of the statements made by the Populists are so ridiculously untrue that but for the effect they might have on those not very well informed on the financial history of the country—the very class which was meant to be influenced, by the way—the whole thing would not have been worth a moment's serious thought. It is on account of this and not for any gravity that resides in the absurd charges in themselves that it becomes necessary for the great Republican party to take even the slightest notice of it. A small cur, when he is vicious, can bite; and there is just as much danger of hydrophobia, too, as if he were a mastiff of royal breed.

I undertook the work of refuting these charges in the first place because I *believed* the public records would furnish me the material to do so for like the majority of unofficial people, I knew too little about finance to more than believe. I have not been disappointed, and if those who do me the honor of reading my little book find their respect for the men who accomplished the great work of reconstruction under so many difficulties increased by my simple recital of facts, in the same ratio as mine has been, into examining into the records of their work, the grand old party will need no monument of marble, for it will have a monument far more enduring in the hearts of the people.

## CHAPTER X.

### AN APPENDIX BUT NOT A SUPPLEMENT.

With the completion of the foregoing chapters, I thought to write "finis" after my work, but a new tract, under a somewhat high-flown title has come under my notice, which affords me an excuse to add a brief resumé of the methods of the Republican party as compared with those of the only other party that has ever had a trial, with a bird's-eye view of the present results, and the wild theories of some who have not had a trial.

This new work seeks to erect a man of straw under the guise of what they call "Imperialism," to frighten gullible people, and because the industrious and enterprising of our community are saving money and the country itself is growing rich, as it should do after more than a hundred years, the writer points a prophetic digit at the history of Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Greece and Rome as a prototype of ours, and in a sepulchral whisper announces that the lack of lucre was the moving cause of the decline and fall of these respective countries. "O consistency, thou art a jewel!" If that were true the very fact that our people are growing rich would seem our best safeguard.

But, alas! in this, as in everything else, the facts, like the Greenback idea of money, seem rather inflated, to say the least; for according to history Assyria gobbled Babylon by brute force, because she was a land of soldiers, while her neighbor, the home of the arts and literature, was not learned in war. Then Assyria and Egypt quarreled, one and

then the other, up and down, like a see-saw, till Greece stepped in and scooped them both.

As to the decline of Greece and Rome, Montagu says that the real cause was their change from religion to atheism.

The religion of the Romans taught them that their country was a place dear to their gods and destined by them to give law to the rest of the universe. This made their courage in her defense invulnerable, and every Roman soldier, being a citizen possessed of property, was equally interested in the safety of the republic for personal reasons, just as every citizen of America is to-day, and the richer they grow the more interested they will become.

But Epicurus arose and, clothed in the shining garb of philosophy, spread his atheistical doctrines broadcast through the land, and these Romans began to ask themselves what was the use of virtue's sacrifices for the sake of enlarging their country if death is but an eternal sleep and man has no account to render for his conduct here? Why not have a good time while existence belonged to them? So the revel began, and debauchery and crime soon routed the army that had hitherto been invincible, the Roman Senate the worst of all, merely because their opportunities were greatest.

Now if these Populists really want to prevent all these disasters being repeated in our country, and at the same time fill a long felt want, they'd better let finance, upon which they do not seem very well posted, alone; and scatter a few leaflets on religion where their ignorance is possibly denser still, among their anarhist adherents.

But I would not begin this work by talking about

the Almighty being "staggered and perplexed" by the doings of a handful of His own creatures; it smacks too much of irreverence.

The view taken in this new screed of the work of our inventors does not seem warranted by the facts as recorded at the Patent Office. They say labor has not been benefitted by the advancement in mechanic arts, and yet our farmers to-day may turn up the soil with a plow run by steam instead of the crooked stick of the Egyptians; to say nothing of the thousand and one useful articles that make the labor of her own sex light; no more roasting over a coal stove in the dog days; no more stitching by candle and till midnight to do the work of an hour; with patent brooms that raise no dust; patent sieves that scatter no flour; patent clothes wringers; egg eaters, and dozens of other things that save the muscle added.

It is true, the men whose study and labor produced these things may have grown rich through their sale, but the veriest churl on earth would hardly begrudge them the reward they so richly merit, and even during the limited period they are sole owners of their own creations others are benefitted far more than they are. It would indeed be a sad day for the brain workers of this country should this class of genteel pirates succeed in appropriating all of the benefit of their labor.

As it is the commissioner publishes a list of patents as long as the moral law, that have, years ago, expired and left their free use as a legacy to the country.

A comparative statement of the patents issued since July 28, 1836, when the present series of numbers of letters patent commenced, will give some

idea of our improvement in that direction. In the year 1837, there were issued 436 patents and reissues, yielding a revenue of \$29,289.08, while the expenditures were \$33,506.98. In 1891, 23,244 were issued, yielding \$1,271,285.78, with expenditures of \$1,139,713.35, leaving a surplus to the credit of the office; and there has been but eight years in all this half century when there was not a surplus making this department more than self-supporting, so that the inventors of our country are not robbing anybody at all events.

It is true that with a labor-saving machine one man may do the work of many men, but this does not argue that the balance of the men must remain idle, for they may be employed making the machine itself; first gathering its material parts, the iron, brass and copper ores from the bowels of the earth, and latterly the marvelous aluminum; the timber from the forest; the glass from the sands of the ocean; and by the time that machine is constructed, hundreds of men have earned their bread and then that wonderful magician, when created, will so multiply the articles it manufactures that this in itself will increase labor, and besides these men may buy much more for their money than in the day when they paid two prices for their rude hand-made articles.

For one, I have no patience with the set of harpies that have sprung up in the country, who sit in idleness and look with envious, covetous eyes upon the proceeds of other people's labor.

In this connection I will give the distinguished opinion of one who has been outrageously misquoted in this later effort, and correct yet another discrepancy.

It reads thus: "Secretary 'McCollough,'"—the writer proving by the spelling of the name that the report was never seen by her—"in his report for December, 1865, says: "We have now about \$2,000,000,000, nearly all in circulation among the people," and then the writer proceeds to put a glowing picture on the canvas of her own imagination with the Secretary's brushes.

Now the fact is, this same statesman, Secretary McCulloch, was bitterly opposed to a very over-  
 flowing currency, and in his report to Congress of 1865 he expatiated at some length upon the financial distresses of former periods, showing that they were, to use his own words, "the direct result of an unhealthy extension of the various forms of credit," our paper among the rest. Thus, in speaking of the great expansion of 1835 and 1836, ending with the terrible financial collapse of 1837, from the effects of which we did not rally for years, he points a warning finger at its repetition, because as he says:

It then seemed to be more reputable to borrow money than to earn it, and pleasanter, and apparently more profitable to speculate than to work; and so the people ran headlong into debt, labor decreased, production fell off, and ruin followed.

He then went on to speak in this wise:

The present inflation, following the suspension of 1861, is the result of heavy expenditures by the Government in the prosecution of the war, and the introduction of a new measure of value in the form of United States and Treasury notes as lawful money. The country as a whole, notwithstanding the ravages of the war and the draught that has been made upon labor, is, by its greatly developed resources (meaning the protective tariff), far in advance in real wealth of what it was in 1857, when the last severe financial crisis occurred. The people are now comparatively free from debt; the banks,

with their secured circulation and large investments in Government securities, although not in an easy condition, and doubtless too much extended, are, it is believed, generally solvent, but the same causes are at work that produced the evils referred to. There is an immense volume of paper money in circulation—under the influence of which prices already enormously high, are steadily advancing, and speculation is increasing—which must be contracted, if similar disasters would be avoided.

Further on in his report Mr. McCulloch says:

The expansion has now reached such a point as to be absolutely oppressive to a large portion of the people, while at the same time it is diminishing labor, and is becoming subversive of good morals.

He then goes on to illustrate, and finally winds up his argument against a large amount of currency thus:

There is no fact more manifest than that the plethora of paper money is not only undermining the morals of the people by encouraging waste and extravagance, but is striking at the root of our material prosperity by diminishing labor. The evil is not, at present, beyond the control of legislation, but it is daily increasing, and if not speedily checked will at no distant day culminate in widespread disaster. The remedy, and the only remedy within the control of Congress is, in the opinion of the Secretary, to be found in the reduction of the currency.

There you have it. Secretary McCulloch differed somewhat from his distinguished countrywoman, but then you know great minds will differ, and the worst cut of all is that this "immense volume of paper money," all told, instead of being almost \$2,000,000,000, as the book states, was but \$704,218,038.20. From page 9 of the Secretary's report to Congress, October 31, 1865, I transcribe the following statements of the amounts then in circulation:



United States notes and fractional currency.....	\$454,218,038.20
National bank notes .....	185,000,000.00
State bank notes .....	65,000,000.00
Total.....	<u>\$704,218,938.20</u>

Added to this, he goes on :

It would probably be safe to say that of the compound interest notes there are about \$30,000,000 in circulation.

But this latter statement was proven to be a mistake ; for when those notes were finally redeemed, their condition of well preserved cleanliness proved that not even \$10,000,000 had ever been utilized as a circulating medium.

I can not understand such a willful misrepresentation of facts ; though I do understand how people may be misled by the Treasury reports themselves, when they do not know the method of tabulating them.

Thus, when mutilated notes are called in for redemption, they merely appear as a part of the receipts, and when they are reissued they appear as a new issue, so that an issue of any kind of money all summed up might look pretty large to those who do not know that a very large part of those put out are balanced by the old notes in place of which they are issued.

This probably accounts for the Populistic statement of the public debt, by which they make out a debt of nearly thirteen billions, when in point of fact the principal and the interest for over thirty years would not together amount to five billions up to the present time ; and instead of being in debt worse than ever, as is flippantly quoted from somebody who knew no more about it than the writer in question, the entire public debt outstand-

ing on May 31 last, was \$969,359,253.61, and of this sum the interest has ceased on \$3,167,345.26, and of the remainder, \$381,162,628.35 is made up of her highly honored demand notes, her precious legal tender notes, fractional currency, National bank notes, etc., on which there never was any interest, so that, instead of being in debt worse than ever, we owe but little over \$500,000,000 of interest-bearing debt, upon which we are paying a greatly reduced interest, and none of this interest is paid on the money that was destroyed.

No interest has ever been paid upon the money that was destroyed, no interest will ever be paid on the money that was destroyed, and no money was ever destroyed anyhow, for, in the first place, the greenbacks bore no interest, and in the second they were not destroyed, because they are still outstanding.

This debt was contracted—notwithstanding the Third Party to the contrary—not only “to form a more perfect union, establish justice, and insure domestic tranquility,” but to save the very life of the Republic; and it “provided for the common defense, and secured the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” by wresting our homes from the mad hand of the spoiler who would have destroyed the Union. Thrice welcome such a debt, and thrice welcome my share of the burden while it is being paid!

They also forget to balance their accounts in summing up the disbursements of the Government in paying off the debt, and I think they will themselves admit that it is hardly fair to count the money paid and leave out the money saved.

In piling up figures to produce their \$13,000,000,000,

the premiums paid by the Government cut quite a figure, being counted, first, as part of the principal and then again separately. Now why does the Government ever pay a premium? The Populist brother objects to it, and yet millions are saved to our public fund by it. For instance:

There is an unnecessary surplus in the Treasury. A part of the debt might as well be paid with it. No bonds are matured; but a premium will induce the holder to yield. The Secretary does a little arithmetic and the result is an offer of an amount that will leave a handsome margin, out of what the cost with accrued interest would be at maturity. The premium is paid and millions saved by the seeming extravagance.

Take, for example, the changes in the interest-bearing debt since March 1, 1889, which, by just such means, have resulted in a saving of over \$50,-000,000, as follows: Four per cents, amounting to \$121,615,950, were bought at a cost of \$152,958,818.83. Their cost at maturity would have been \$206,555,-288.50, a saving of \$53,965,469.67. Four and a half per cents amounting to \$137,477,700 cost \$143,388,-12.37. They would have commanded at maturity \$145,114,136.21, a saving of \$1,756,023.84. Total saving, \$55,352,493.51. And in addition to this the amount of \$25,364,500 of 4½ per cent. bonds were continued at 2 per cent., saving to the Government an annual interest of \$634,112.50 more.

Where economy is needed a Republican administration can economize. But it is no part of wisdom to save at the spigot what must eventually be wasted at the bung-hole. Neither is it the policy of the Republican party to run this large and growing country on a provincial scale. And the parsimony

mony of the Democracy looks smaller than ever when compared with the generous policy that would improve, enlarge and better the country, while at the same time the appropriation necessary to do so lifts the cash from its hiding place in the Treasury and scatters it broadcast among the working people, thus keeping it in circulation.

There has been much said about the "billion dollar Congress" and the melting away of the large surplus under its benign influence, and, with the report of the Appropriations Committee before me, I note some of the items. To begin with, the pensions of our soldiers had been kept down at the lowest ebb by the Democrats when in power in the House, and our once brawny defenders were growing old and feeble. The pension appropriation of the preceding Congress had been but \$175,017,400, much of that a deficiency to re-enforce the even smaller sums of previous years, and so, the Republicans of the Fifty-first Congress, many of them ex-Union soldiers themselves, gave their less fortunate brothers all that the revenues would afford, and appropriated in the two sessions \$288,329,751.69.

Our mail is growing, too, and the appropriation that sent it once or twice a week on horseback to Baltimore from Washington in former times is now sufficient for our splendid mail service now, when every village can have its daily mail; therefore this "billion-dollar Congress" appropriated \$150,133,921.60 for our mail. But this is a great part of it, if not all, supplied by our postal revenues.

Further, the Republican party is in favor of helping all who can earn their daily bread honestly, which naturally brings the farmer to the front with

his largely growing interests; and, as the Weather Bureau also had been transferred from the War Department to the tender mercy of Uncle Jerry Rusk, the sum needed was almost doubled, and those "dreadful Republicans" actually "wasted" \$4,827,253.50 of the "people's money" on our farming industry. These are, of course, only a few of the many items that swelled the amount to \$988,417,-183.34.

Still, there was money left of the hoard that had for years been locked in the Treasury by Democratic economy (?), doing nobody any good, and so \$289,000,000 of the debt was wiped out.

The Republican party has no excuse to offer for the "billion dollar Congress," because, in the first place, every cent of the money was judiciously expended; and in the second place the circulation per capita was increased almost a dollar a head; and in the third place, the so-called economists of the next Congress appropriated almost \$500,000,000 in their first session, and after knifing everybody in sight also, and crippling our service so that even the garbage of our Capital City had to be almost half of it collected *on credit*.

This is the way the immense surplus of 1890 came about by the way. Controlling the appropriations for years, with but the two years' interregnum of the Forty-seventh Congress, their skin-flint policy piled up the money brought to our revenues by the tax which these free-traders insisted on for the protection of the sugar industry—an infant that would not grow with all their coddling—and improvements halted, while the Democratic politician made political capital out of "economy."

For the Census reports show that a single mort-

gage may be counted more than once, because it is frequently shown on the separate records of the places of residence of the several parties to it, when they live in different townships.

And besides, partial payments have been made in many cases that have almost cleared the mortgage, of which there is no record because it is not completed.

I do not know where these people get their statistics as to the amount of land owned by speculators, as there are no such persons known on the records of the Land Office, where no tabulated reports have been made anyhow.

The idea of turning our farmers into tenants against their will is really grotesque. I presume the business of the farmer fails some time, and becoming bankrupt he is sold out just like other people who fail in business. It is a sad event and everybody must sympathize with such an individual; but why with the farmer more than the mechanic, merchant, or banker?

As for "caste" that this benevolent lady represents as growing up here so rapidly, I would like to invite her to our Capital City, and by the time she is hustled off the sidewalk, made to stand up in the street cars, and take a back seat at most of our public gatherings, while her cook, chambermaid, and coachman elbow her out of the way, she will begin to think that caste is not "indigenous to our soil," at any rate.

There *are* some rich men in our Senate and the President's Cabinet. That is one truth out of the many misstatements. But how a poor man can ever afford to accept either position is more than I can see. The salary of a Senator is \$5,000 per an-

num, and that of a member of the Cabinet is \$8,000, and the running expenses of each office, to say nothing of the family expenses of a man in such a position, who is expected to yield unlimited hospitality to the dear constituents, amounts to more than he receives. Some of the Senators who have large districts are compelled to hire two or three clerks, whom they must pay out of their own pockets, to attend to the many things required of them outside of their duties at the Senate; writing letters to and running errands for their people, etc.

The wage-earner of America is not, as a class, oppressed by the millionaire or anybody else. There are individual instances of that kind, I am sorry to say, where work being scarce, employers have the advantage. But the tables are often turned when the conditions are reversed, and the working people know how to take advantage of it, too. When one hundred men are wanted to do a job of work, and there are only ninety-nine men to be had, labor is at a premium, and the laborer can dictate his own terms, and he generally does it. Wages go up, privileges are numerous, etc.

But when there are 100 men who want work and only work enough for ninety-nine the spirit of the dream changes and wages go down. It is simply the law of supply and demand, together with the proneness of all mankind to seize every personal advantage. The law has nothing to do with that, and with the best intentions our law-makers cannot legislate human selfishness out of existence. So, unless our socialistic friends undertake to regulate the Almighty and dictate a new enactment in law divine, they will have to content themselves with the "leaflets" mentioned above.

So Imperialism in America turns out a myth, along with its organ the *Imperialist*. At least the Hon. Levi P. Morton says he never heard of it, and he was its chief patron according to this Populist historian. If any such publication existed it was evidently the bubble creation of some of the numerous cranks that have become so blatant in this land of freedom, where, according to our free institutions, the much-needed restrictions can not be put upon them—more's the pity—that they seem to be “indigenous to our soil,” at least; but that bubble burst inside of a year, as the lady admits, which proves also that the idea was not very popular, even in New York, where the millionaire business is said to be at a premium.

It would be, indeed, hard for any political party to be compelled to shoulder the responsibility of all the cranks, plotters, and malcontents—more numerous than ever since this third party has been hatching—that are only happy when they are crying somebody down, or building up some new and impossible scheme.

Now, I am aware that this appended chapter is, to a certain extent, but another repetition of the many answers that I have given already in the body of this work, to the same old song which they are continually harping on that one string of how “we, us and company” *would* run the Government if we could *only* “*get there* ;” questions that I have answered too completely to entitle this to be called a “supplement,” but which is made necessary by the fact that all these cunningly built statements are so devised as to appeal directly to the personal interests of some, who know too little



about our public affairs, to detect the false bottom on which they stand.

Then began their cry of too much surplus while Republicans were in, and then when the Republicans by means of wise and equitable appropriations gave work to hundreds of wage-earners, they changed the cry to "deficiency," and helped spend the money themselves by a system of espionage in the shape of investigating committees; which course reminds me of the case of a discontented husband that I once knew.

He was a niggardly fellow, with no regard for the refinements of life, and his wife was a great trouble to him, because she insisted on preserving at least the decencies in their mode of living; so he determined to get rid of her, and secretly consulted a lawyer about getting a divorce for him.

"Well," said the man of law, "what charge do you make against your wife?"

"She spends my money," said he, "so that I can lay up nothing for my old age. Isn't that enough?"

"Hum! let me see," said the lawyer. "How much is your salary?"

"Twelve hundred a year."

"How many children have you?"

"Three."

"That makes five in family, with \$20 per month each," computed the lawyer. "My dear sir, how do you expect to live on less in a city like this? And, yet you are paying for the house you live in out of it, which convinces me that your wife must do the greater part of her own work into the bargain. Why, sir, I would be the laughing stock of the community to bring such a case. You will have

to find some charge more tenable—infidelity or something of that kind.”

“I have never suspected anything of the kind,” the man admitted, and went sorrowfully away. But from that hour the poor woman was under espionage, not that he hoped to find her guilty, for nobody knew the purity of her life better than he, but that he might catch her in some indiscreet act that could be distorted into a charge. And this is Democratic economy.

Now let us take a look at the policy of the last administration, and see if it did not solve the problem of how to maintain the happy medium between inflation and contraction.

According to Secretary Foster, whose word, if it needed support, is amply sustained by the official records, the income of 1891 from revenue, etc., averaged under the workings of the McKinley law \$32,717,702.94 per month; government expenses averaged \$30,481,175.44 per month. This left a monthly balance after all expenses were paid of \$2,236,545.16, which is considered a safe balance, one that would be sufficient for most unexpected emergencies at any time, and yet would not accumulate a surplus faster than the debt travels toward maturity, which, of course, would lay an unnecessary burden on the people.

Land monopoly is another of the nightmares that prance in this third party dream, and like all the rest, it is a “dark horse,” an exceedingly “dark horse,” and that style of beast is not winning the race this year. The alien land-holders are a special aggravation, it seems. Well, prior to 1837, under our graduation acts and laws regulating private sales of public lands, aliens were per-

mitted to acquire such lands. It is possible, therefore, that under those laws aliens may have acquired large areas of land in this country, just as our people accumulate property in Europe; and if a Populist has a farm for sale and finds a purchaser in a representative of Johnny Bull, "or any other man," who is to prevent him from selling to him, I would like to know? As for the United States Government, that has done all that is possible in the premises by passing a law March 3, 1887, to restrict the ownership of real estate in the Territories to American citizens; if the several States decide differently the States have that privilege, according to the Constitution.

But many of our alien neighbors came here when the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo decided the boundary line between Mexico and the United States; or, rather, we went to them. Many acres of the land which was thus allotted to the United States were then discovered to be owned and occupied by Mexicans. "Every man's home is his castle" in law, and so these previously acquired rights the treaty also protected; and Mexicans established in this territory were by the terms of the treaty left free to continue there or remove to Mexico, retaining their property or selling it just as they pleased, retaining the rights and titles of Mexican citizens, or becoming citizens of the United States at their pleasure. Many, while retaining their land, remained true to their allegiance to their native land; and thus it came about that many acres of our land are owned by Mexicans.

By the way, while these people are downing monopoly, I would like to call attention to the fact that one of their Senators might be regulated a

little on that subject, for he seems in danger of monopolizing the Senate, having three members of his immediate family in its employ: and that these are the whole of his family is probably the reason he has no more than three provided for.

Another dreadful crime is also cited in this connection, viz.: the grant of lands to railroads. Now, as the Government retains every alternate section, which is doubled in value by the building of the road; and as it also keeps back all the mineral lands, while at the same time it thus secures means of transportation for the grain of the farmer and the supplies of the whole country, I think this charge also fails to make connection.

Farms are not decreasing in the United States either. It may be true that the American farmer owned 50 per cent. of all the farm property in 1860 and only 25 per cent. in 1880, and 20 per cent. in 1890, as some have computed. But this property, which by the census included not only the land itself, but the agricultural implements, the stock, and in case of the Southern farmer the slaves, amounted in value in 1860 to about \$16,000,000,000. But between 1860 and 1880 the war occurred; the slaves were emancipated, thus depreciating the American farmers' stock to the tune of about \$2;000,000,000; the property destroyed by the two armies amounted to about as much more, and, therefore, by the logical events of the times, four billions of his eight were swept away.

But the total value of what was left had become by this time in round numbers \$44,000,000,000, so that the twenty-five per cent. accredited to him was worth \$1,000,000,000 in spite of these losses; and in 1890, the total value being increased to \$62,-

000,000,000, his twenty per cent. was worth \$12,000,000,000.

Thus, although the farmer's per cent. of farm property may have declined from 50 in 1860 to 20 in 1890, he is richer by \$4,000,000,000 now than then.

Besides this, the census does not show all his increase, for while it shows his land, stock, and implements, it does not show the money expended in living and rearing his family; nor does it show the money he has deposited in bank. From statistics furnished by the banks of Kansas it is shown that the farmers of that State, where farm distress is reported as greatest, own fifteen per cent. of all the bank stock and have forty per cent. of the deposits in the banks of that State, which same, must necessarily appear in the census records, accredited to the "insatiable maw" of the banks aforesaid.

And the mortgages, also, are often grossly, though innocently misrepresented by the census reports, because it is impossible to give in tables all the ramifications of red tape.

Now I have faithfully given you an account of the Republican stewardship. But that party is out of power, and the reverse side is presented, a side that the deluded Populist party made possible by their misrepresentations, bearing false witness, in defiance of the decalogue. Now look on the picture; it is not a pretty one.

Free trade, merely threatened, has obstructed the avenues of business to such an extent that our revenues have gone down until they have been insufficient for our expenditures; and the gold reserve of \$100,000,000, so religiously kept intact by the Republicans, has been encroached upon to meet the

emergency ; and although \$50,000,000 worth of bonds have been sold to restore it, there is now little more than that sum left in the Treasury, \$52,189,500 of it, on August 8, 1894 ; and an actual deficit of \$69,000,000, between the receipts and the expenditures of last year, left over for the future to square up.

When the Republican Party laid down their charge in 1893, there was \$137,837,899.70 of gold coin in the Treasury, and \$79,835,048.21 in bullion. A total of \$217,672,947.91. The intact gold reserve, and the net cash balance over all demand liabilities, being \$124,128,087.88. The public debt, both interest-bearing and noninterest-bearing, had been steadily reduced, and the per capita circulation steadily increased. On the other hand, the present administration, according to their last report, August 1, has increased the public debt by \$67,143,540.05 ; the gold—coin and bullion—has dwindled down to \$120,922,836, with a constantly decreasing per capita circulation. “Under which king, Bezonian? Speak,

In desperation at this state of affairs, the present Congress has resorted to the favorite Democratic cure-rule, “economy,” and while everybody who has a claim on the appropriations, has been knifed most scientifically, especially the soldier, the Departments have kept even pace, crippling the service by turning an army of faithful employés into the streets to join the multitude of starving American citizens, made tramps by our closing mills and factories ; and many mutilated soldiers are among them, with pensions cut off, and employment taken away in the land they risked their lives to save, by the very people whom they prevented from destroying it. Verily, the ways of a self-governing

people are passing strange, for many soldiers voted Democratic in the last election. Blind to their own interest, the gamin in the street could teach them a lesson; for when he wins at a game of marbles, does he fork over his trophy to the vanquished foe? Not much.

The Demoerats claim to have saved on the appropriations for 1895 the neat sum of \$28,835,989.70 over the last session of the last Congress. Now let us see just how they saved it. First and foremost, the soldiers—always first to be skinned by the Demoerats—have had their pensions reduced to the tune of \$29,099,504.85, just \$263,515.15 more than the whole saving.

And last year we had the World's Fair and the Census both on our hands, the two aggregating \$1,621,500.

So, if we leave out these three items, these famous economists have actually increased the appropriations, after hampering many of the departments by innumerable discharges, reducing the salaries of many of those left, and at the same time increasing their burden already heavy, by the extra work thus made. A lot of mill hands would strike for far less provocation. And yet there is a deficiency left of \$29,994,471.20, which will have to be made up next session—*after the election is safely over.*

But while the "small fry" of the departments have been reduced and discharged by hundreds, and the soldiers cheated out of their pensions, and while the "great unwashed" have again thought it immaterial to provide for the disposal of the garbage of our capital city, that is even now crying to Heaven, with a very loud odor, many of the

high officials, already well provided for, have been handsomely increased to one, two, and three thousand more per annum.

All these things show who are the true friends to the working man, the soldier, and the country at large; and if those who have been seeking aid through the aimless and misguided Populist party, and thus helping destroy the friends who have never yet failed them, will view the situation in an unprejudiced manner, they will vote the Republican ticket hereafter.



What General J. S. CLARKSON says about it:

It is a serious and continuing party mistake that your spee-  
s for the Emery malaras and miasmas have not been printed  
and circulated all over the West and South for two years. The  
very works have done, and are constantly doing serious  
harm, and leading away honest but superficial Republicans.  
She pours sorrow and tears and emotion in all she says, and lies  
in that way are always influential over hysterical and im-  
possible people. A better hook, more sensibly written would  
usually do far less harm than this emotional and skyrockety  
hook. Its circulation is still kept up, and I have myself  
and several good people in the West, who were carried away  
by its sophistries—and saying: These charges must be true  
and the author herself goes into tears when compelled by  
honour and duty to make them. She seeks and finds the sym-  
pathetic side in honest people, and the sensational in others,  
makes many converts, and disenchant many honest Re-  
publicans who are down in their neck, and anxious for some  
one to pity them.

Your work has good heart as any article ever had, and good  
reasons, and overthrows in fair yet thorough manner all  
the false works of her sophistries and falsehoods, tears and all.  
People who have read her, would the more eagerly read you.  
No one else has grasped the details, arrayed the facts, and  
demonstrated both the wisdom and the kindness of Republican  
principles and their views as you have. It is improvidence in  
a party not to print and circulate it broadcast.  
A quarter of a million of your hooks ought to go into the  
shops this fall and winter.

From Senator CHARLES F. MANDERSON:

Heartily concur in the foregoing letter of General Clark-  
son. "The Story of Heracles, or the Truth About the Finan-  
cial Legislation of the Republican Party," as told so clearly  
and intelligently by Mrs. Burke, is such that it should be in  
the hands of every voter in sections of the country where the  
lies and the misrepresentations of the Populists have  
deep root. I have purchased a number of them for circula-  
tion in my own section, and believe they will prove to be of  
great value.

Word from Senator WILLIAM B. ALLISON:

Your hook will be a valuable contribution to the  
general literature.


Also from Senator JOHN SHERMAN:

Your work will be of very great value in the West, where  
the lies of Mrs. Emery seem to prevail.









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